Chinese checkers [and Cambodia is its pawn]

The spectre of big-power rivalry spoils an ASEAN gathering 

Jul 21st 2012

The Economist

PHNOM PENH

WHEN the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sat down to a foreign ministers’ meeting in the Cambodian capital last week, it hoped to chalk up progress towards a European Union-style economic block by 2015. By the time the meeting ended on July 13th, it looked almost as dysfunctional as the euro zone itself.

For the first time since ASEAN was founded 45 years ago, one of its meetings ended without a communiqué. No great loss there: such statements tend to be instantly forgettable. But the absence reflected a falling-out between Cambodia, chairing the proceedings, and members such as the Philippines and Vietnam. This, in turn, reflected what analysts say is a growing rift between ASEAN countries loyal to China, and those contesting territory with it in the South China Sea, a group that increasingly looks for support to America.

The acrimony was almost unprecedented in a group which, according to the Straits Times, a Singaporean newspaper, likes to resolve disputes “quietly amid the rustle of batik silks”. The assertion, made between diplomatic clenched teeth, was that Cambodia bowed to China in blocking an attempt by the Philippines and Vietnam to refer in the communiqué to Manila’s recent naval stand-off with Beijing over the disputed Scarborough Shoal.

Indonesia, bravely trying to find a way to mollify the chair, reportedly offered 18 different drafts for approval; all to no avail. Its foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, expressed “profound disappointment” over the outcome. Behind closed doors, the atmosphere was poisonous. Even in public, the bitterness was surprising. Cambodia pinned the blame squarely on those who it said wanted to “condemn China”.

The communiqué was not the only casualty. Following the Philippines’ dispute with China, and the lingering tussle between China and Vietnam over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands and oil-drilling rights nearby, ASEAN had hoped to conclude a code of conduct, ten years in the making, to help keep the peace in a stretch of water through which half the world’s shipping travels.

The code, which is strongly supported by America, was expected to cover issues such as the terms of engagement to be used when naval vessels meet in disputed waters. Its progress was unclear. China, which has long insisted that maritime disputes should be settled bilaterally with its smaller neighbours, rather than multilaterally, through forums such as ASEAN, only agreed to discuss the matter “when conditions are ripe”—an open-ended formula that further muddied the waters.

Both China and America put positive spins on the outcome. The Chinese described it as a “productive meeting” in which its views had “won the appreciation and support of many participating countries”. Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, sought to hide her disappointment. She said it was a sign of a growing maturity that ASEAN was “wrestling with some very hard issues here”.

Within the organisation, however, the fear is that its cherished autonomy and ability to compromise—the so-called ASEAN way—is under threat from big-power rivalries, however reluctant China and America may be to risk naval escalation. The Cambodian government insists there are no strings attached to more than $10 billion in foreign aid and soft loans that it has received from China during the past 18 years, but there is no doubt that Beijing has an influence: some of the maps in the Peace Palace in Phnom Penh had Chinese place names in the South China Sea. Analysts say that Laos, also bankrolled by China, is in its camp.

Maritime states such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are more concerned by China’s muscle-flexing. However, some commentators fear that too much American support may be emboldening countries like the Philippines to be more assertive within ASEAN about their problems with China.

Japan, too, supports the idea of a pro-American grouping in the region to counterbalance China. North-east of the South China Sea lies a small crop of islands that Japan and China are squabbling over. All such disputes stir up intense nationalist feelings around the region, which makes it difficult for diplomats to settle matters placidly. All the more reason for a maritime code of conduct to make sure hot-heads do not call the shots.