The Historian's Responsibility

The Historian's Responsibility

Captain Julius F. Sanks

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The theory that histories should not be written until fifty or a hundred years have passed may be valid, at least for controversial subjects.1 The controversy of the Vietnam War, for example, may not be so much dead as dormant, for it certainly has resurfaced in Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia.* The book is a history of the war in Cambodia with emphasis on wiretaps and other "high crimes and misdemeanors."

    *William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, $13.95), 467 pages.

British journalist William Shawcross maintains that Cambodia was at peace with the world until Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon, acting illegally, authorized B-52 strikes on areas of Cambodia suspected of being staging areas for North Vietnam. These bombings forced the North Vietnamese to withdraw deeper into Cambodia, which caused the air strikes to penetrate farther, thus, destroying more Cambodian civilians. It also caused the Khmer Rouge to gain sufficient strength to defeat the Lon Nol regime. The implication is that had there been no B-52 strikes, Cambodia would today be a peaceful and prosperous nation.

A Cambodian girl salvages a board from her home in Neak Luong, southeast of Phnom Penh, which was hit by a misdirected U.S. bombing raid - politifact

The significance of Sideshow lies in the manner in which Shawcross has reported and analyzed this unfortunate campaign, rather than whether his conclusions are correct. The Vietnam War, as a defeat for the United States, should be understood in terms of what happened there and the way the war progressed. After all, the United States was not outfought in Vietnam; nor was it overwhelmed by superior numbers and technology. It simply made more mistakes than the enemy.

Shawcross has exaggerated a few of the mistakes made in Cambodia and ignored the rest. He has let reason be clouded by emotionalism in his unrelenting condemnation of the actions and motivations of Nixon and Kissinger. Consequently, Shawcross has failed to make his point.

The narrative is a disjointed collection of chapters, each covering one aspect of the fighting in Cambodia. The central point that links the chapters is the "villainy" of Kissinger, and, to a lesser extent, Nixon. Shawcross portrays them as two evil manipulators who backbite, lie, and connive their way to their nefarious goals. Their every action appears to have been either illegal, immoral, or irrational.

Shawcross contends that Nixon’s decision to conduct B-52 raids over Cambodia was a usurpation of the congressional power to declar war. The question of war powers has long been a difficult point in constitutional law, as exemplified by the debates surrounding War Powers Resolution of 1973.2 To assert, a Shawcross has done, that bombing Cambodia was illegal, because Congress had not declared, war, is to ignore both the historical struggle between the executive and legislative branches and the legal basis for the Vietnam War. It can be argued that the Cambodian operations, being directed against North Vietnamese rather than Cambodian forces, were legally permissible under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.3

Continuing his legal arguments, Shaw accuses Kissinger and Nixon of violating the Cooper-Church amendment that sharply limited U.S. military involvement in Cambodia. He indicates that this amendment was passed as part of the 1970 amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, and that it "prohibited all air operations in direct support of Cambodian forces" after 30 June 1970.4 He omits that this amendment is not part of the act as legislated, having been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only. The amendment later became law on 1 January 1971 as part of the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.5 As enacted, there is no prohibition of air operations. The amendment expressly forbids financing the "introduction of United ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."6 Shawcross repeatedly cites this reference to claim the administration’s air operations were illegal.

Shawcross does not hesitate to employ a double standard to show that everything Kissinger and Nixon did was wrong. He criticizes the United States for recognizing Lon No the coup that overthrew Prince Sihanouk, although he concedes there is no evidence of U.S. intervention. He condemns the United States for supporting Lon Nol with weapons and supplies and, finally, for failing to assist Lon Nol’s army against the Khmer Rouge adequately, despite the fact that the Cooper-Church amendment (as passed into law) had by that time precluded such actions.

The impression Shawcross conveys is that of two men, crazed with power, manipulating the world as if it were a musical instrument. As a matter of fact, the rational and irrational acts that contributed to the Cambodian situation began long before the presidency of Richard Nixon.

Had Shawcross not hounded Kissinger and Nixon so emotionally, he might have criticized the North Vietnamese for using Cambodia as a staging area and refuge. He might have seen that his narrative indicates that Nixon and Kissinger genuinely desired a peace negotiation for the United States. And he might have recognized the truth of Otto von Bismarck’s philosophy of statesmanship: "Man cannot create the current of events. He can only float with it and steer."7 Kissinger and Nixon cannot have been as totally responsible for Cambodia’s agony as Shawcross claims, regardless of the legality of their acts. They were, however, well aware that the fighting in Cambodia was a classic case of Clausewitzian warfare.

Has Shawcross studied Clausewitz? Probably not. He has neglected the essential point that the military operations in Southeast Asia were conducted to achieve political goals. Extension of the war into Cambodia was intended to help achieve those goals; criticism of the responsible decision-makers should be tempered by understanding the friction of battle they have to contend with. Shawcross has shown neither understanding nor the knowledge of strategy necessary to analyze military operations and their goals. His lengthy discussion of domestic wiretaps bears little relationship to the bombing of Cambodia; on the other hand, the Linebacker operations, which did affect the Cambodian situation, are barely mentioned. Altering reality to depict the fighting in Cambodia as a Greek tragedy, as Shawcross has done, serves no purpose.

The reader should remember from Sideshow that not everything in print represents reality. In their analyses, historians must accept the facts as they stand, examine them as rationally and unemotionally as possible, and present conclusions. How else are we to learn?

Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota

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