Asean's Faulty Microphone Diplomacy

FOCUS / THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
Asean's faulty megaphone diplomacy
The notion of a regional approach to resolving Burma is dead
By MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS
Twenty years ago in a wood-panelled conference room in Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja threw out an odd idea in front of a group of foreign journalists. What if, he mused, we were to throw a cocktail party and invited all the warring Cambodian factions? At the time the issue of Kampuchea, as the United Nations referred to Cambodia, was the most vexing on Asean's agenda. No one could persuade the different political factions to reconcile and throw off the yoke of Vietnamese occupation.
For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, then only six members, it was an awkward reminder of the Indochina wars and an obstacle to achieving the vision of regional integration and prosperity.
The cocktail party idea, which was conceived by Mr Mochtar and his former diplomat ministerial colleague Fuad Hassan, seized on the notion of a gathering in which people came and mingled informally with no fixed agenda.
As a diplomatic device it was ingenious because it not only cut through the petty differences between the factions _ royalists, republicans, Khmer Rouge and pro-Vietnamese communists _ but also neutralised the larger powers that backed them.
The original plan was to hold the cocktail party in a Bali resort. Eventually, the term ''Cocktail Party'' was replaced by the less frivolous ''Jakarta Informal Meeting'' and the stately old palace of Bogor in West Java was chosen as the venue.
The meeting was a significant moment in modern Asian diplomacy, for it underscored the value of flexibility and accommodation over the use of firm ultimatums and brinkmanship.
As a result of the JIM formula, deftly steered by Mr Mochtar's successor Ali Alatas, Vietnam softened its stance on dialogue with the Cambodian opposition and agreed to pull out its troops.
The process wasn't smooth, yet by the early 1990s, a fully-fledged peace process was in place and a UN mission oversaw peaceful democratic elections.
Most important of all, Cambodian sovereignty was rescued and preserved.
If only Asean's modern leaders had longer memories.
The disastrous debacle over Burma at this year's 40th anniversary Asean summit in Singapore could have been avoided if the style of personal, low-key diplomacy pioneered during the JIM process was still in play. For it wasn't just Indonesian diplomats who steered the Cambodian engagement; they received help from colleagues in other Asean countries _ many of them in senior positions today.
It was the first and, sadly, the last time that Asean proved its worth as an effective regional security body.
Of course, the world has changed since the late 1980s. The simple old Cold War calculus has been replaced by a Rubik cube of interlocking interests in the region: China and India are the new regional powers whilst Russia, Europe and the United States have lost influence. Asean is a larger grouping of 10 disparate nations, no longer the cosy golf-playing club of six.
Cambodia was a weakened state occupied by foreign forces, whilst Burma is in the grip of a strong military junta that strongly resists the merest hint of foreign interference.
But comparing apples and oranges isn't the point here; the poor quality of regional diplomacy is the critical issue.
In the late 1980s, diplomacy was conducted in smoke-filled hotel function rooms observed only by a small band of reporters. Since then, politics has intruded. Diplomats answer to publicity-seeking politicians. Quiet diplomacy has been replaced by megaphone diplomacy.
Look how eager Asean leaders were to publicly denounce the Burmese military junta after the crackdown on the protesting monks in October. There were plenty of strong words, yet no one had a plan; no one within Asean could pull together a working consensus.
The world watched and waited for the Asean summit in Singapore, where it was expected that Burma would be publicly reprimanded or punished. American diplomats said there can be no business as usual.
But in the end, when hosts Singapore arranged for UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari to brief the summit, Burma's prime minister dug in his heels. The frail consensus fell apart and one senior Asean diplomat remarked, ''The notion of a regional approach to resolving Burma is dead.''
Observing how easily Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein was able to beat his Asean peers into surrender in Singapore, Ali Alatas, now chief adviser to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, shook his head in amazement.
Mr Alatas not only steered the JIM process 20 years ago, but has served as Indonesia's special envoy and represented the United Nations in the pursuit of political reconciliation in Burma.
He knows that the hard-line generals in their remote new capital Naypyidaw won't respond to threats and ultimatums, and they have survived high-stakes brinkmanship played out in the UN Security Council.
Would quiet diplomacy work? One view is that a regional effort to address the concerns of Burma's military rulers regarding the country's economic and social cohesion might promote a constructive exchange of views.
A discussion about broader issues of economic development and the position of the country's ethnic minorities would serve to address fears expressed in Burma's military circles that without their role, the country will fall apart.
However, it seems unlikely that the loud chorus of calls for democracy in Burma will fade. Fearing an agenda of regime change and the instability that might ensue, China will work with others in the region, including India, to undermine efforts at effective engagement.
Perhaps the officials who now conduct regional diplomacy should go back to their notes and records from 20 years ago and recall what first bloomed under a clear sky towards the end of July at the Bogor palace in 1988.
Times may change, but the basic principles of successful diplomacy, building trust and forging consensus through dialogue, are immutable.
The writer is regional director for Asia at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, based in Singapore.