Photo: Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (photo from the Thailand government website).
By Dan Waites | 21 Sep 2011
Briefing
Read original article at World Politics Review
This is the second of a two-part series examining the policies and political challenges facing the new government of Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Part I examined domestic issues. Part II examines foreign policy and the implications for regional stability.
With its domestic opponents watching closely for missteps, the government of Thailand's recently elected prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, will have to tread extremely carefully in matters of foreign policy. The mishandling of relations with Cambodia by the administration of Yingluck's predecessor, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, had resulted in border skirmishes that killed 28 people this year alone. Yingluck's Pheu Thai party seized on the issue by including among its campaign pledges a promise to "mend relations with neighboring countries." But while a potential rapprochement with Cambodia appears to present an opportunity for the Yingluck government, it also poses a significant threat at a time when the administration's legitimacy is already being questioned.
It was never very likely that the Abhisit administration would enjoy a good relationship with Cambodia. Abhisit took office following anti-government protests by the nationalist People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), protests he had tacitly backed. The resulting appointment as foreign minister of Kasit Piromya, a PAD leader who had called Cambodian Premier Hun Sen "crazy" and a "slave," set the tone for what was to come -- deadly border conflict centered around the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple, which stands on disputed territory.
In February, troops on the border began exchanging artillery fire, killing eight soldiers and civilians. Each side claimed the other had fired first. The fighting led the U.N. Security Council to call for a cease-fire and to entrust the negotiation of a more permanent peace to the Association of South East Asian Nations. Soon after, the two sides reached a deal in Jakarta that called for dispatching Indonesian observers to the border area to monitor a cease-fire. But resistance from the Thai army -- and protests by the PAD -- kept the observers from being deployed. In late-April, 18 were killed when fighting resumed around the Ta Moan and Ta Karbey temples, about 90 miles west of Preah Vihear.
Yingluck's government now has an opportunity to show that Thailand can co-exist peacefully with its neighbors. She will be helped by the close personal relationship her brother, exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, enjoys with Hun Sen, who appointed Thaksin in 2009 as an economic adviser to the Cambodian government, much to the Abhisit administration's chagrin. Yet the two men's friendship is as much a potential vulnerability as a strength, as Yingluck's political opponents will exploit any deal perceived as compromising Thai sovereignty. In 2008, pressure from Abhisit's Democrat Party forced then-Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama to resign for supporting Cambodia's efforts to have Preah Vihear listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, told WPR, "Getting too close to Hun Sen may open the door for [the PAD] to continue to politicize the issue. As long as Thailand cannot solve its domestic problems, the relationship with Cambodia will remain unstable."
Equally fraught is the fate of disputed oil and gas deposits in the Gulf of Thailand. A 10,000-square-mile swathe of offshore territory, known as the overlapping claims area, is estimated to contain some 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and a sizable quantity of oil. With billions of dollars at stake, several major extraction companies are already eyeing the prize, but the two sides have been unable to agree on a revenue-sharing agreement. Now, warmer relations make a deal more likely. At the same time, Thaksin's relations with Hun Sen will put the government at high risk of accusations of selling out.
Meanwhile, the government looks just as vulnerable in Thailand's deep south, which has been plagued by separatist violence that has at times poisoned relations with Malaysia. Thaksin's heavy handed treatment of the problem in 2004 brought the simmering conflict to a boil. Two massacres, at Tak Bai and at Krue Se mosque, remain emblematic of his gross mishandling of the insurgency. The military cited the rapid deterioration of the situation on Thaksin's watch as one reason for the coup that ousted him in September 2006.
Nevertheless, subsequent administrations -- not least the junta that ruled Thailand for a year following Thaksin's overthrow -- have scarcely proved better at handling the conflict. More than 4,700 people have been killed since 2004, and the past six months have seen a dramatic upsurge in violence. The credibility of the Democrats' oft-repeated claim that only they understand the south has been severely tested.
During a campaign visit to the region, Yingluck proposed granting autonomy to Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces, an idea long favored in some corners of academia. Yet in other quarters, most notably the Royal Thai Army and the Interior Ministry, such a solution remains unthinkable, constituting a break from the idea of a unified Thai state under the constitutional monarchy. Once again, the government runs the risk of being accused of betraying Thai sovereignty.
Perhaps inevitably, the Thaksin issue has already infected the Foreign Ministry. The appointment of Surapong Towijakchaikul as foreign minister had already raised eyebrows, given his lack of experience and relation by marriage to the Shinawatras -- his aunt is married to Thaksin's uncle. When it emerged that Surapong had made a personal request through the Japanese Embassy for Thaksin to be issued a special entry permit to visit Japan, he became a target. Claiming that Thailand's foreign minister was facilitating the travel of a convicted criminal, rather than seeking his extradition, the Democrat Party filed a police complaint against Surapong and launched a petition to have him impeached. The embattled minister filed countercharges, but the political damage was already done.
Many observers had expected the Yingluck government to work longer and harder to earn the public's trust before making its inevitable move to rehabilitate its exiled patron. Instead, the suspicion is growing that Thaksin's return is seen as a pressing priority. But with the wounds of the past five years still far from healed, it seems unlikely his enemies will stay passive for long. The seeds of Thailand's future unrest have been sown.
Dan Waites is a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
This is the second of a two-part series examining the policies and political challenges facing the new government of Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Part I examined domestic issues. Part II examines foreign policy and the implications for regional stability.
With its domestic opponents watching closely for missteps, the government of Thailand's recently elected prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, will have to tread extremely carefully in matters of foreign policy. The mishandling of relations with Cambodia by the administration of Yingluck's predecessor, former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, had resulted in border skirmishes that killed 28 people this year alone. Yingluck's Pheu Thai party seized on the issue by including among its campaign pledges a promise to "mend relations with neighboring countries." But while a potential rapprochement with Cambodia appears to present an opportunity for the Yingluck government, it also poses a significant threat at a time when the administration's legitimacy is already being questioned.
It was never very likely that the Abhisit administration would enjoy a good relationship with Cambodia. Abhisit took office following anti-government protests by the nationalist People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), protests he had tacitly backed. The resulting appointment as foreign minister of Kasit Piromya, a PAD leader who had called Cambodian Premier Hun Sen "crazy" and a "slave," set the tone for what was to come -- deadly border conflict centered around the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple, which stands on disputed territory.
In February, troops on the border began exchanging artillery fire, killing eight soldiers and civilians. Each side claimed the other had fired first. The fighting led the U.N. Security Council to call for a cease-fire and to entrust the negotiation of a more permanent peace to the Association of South East Asian Nations. Soon after, the two sides reached a deal in Jakarta that called for dispatching Indonesian observers to the border area to monitor a cease-fire. But resistance from the Thai army -- and protests by the PAD -- kept the observers from being deployed. In late-April, 18 were killed when fighting resumed around the Ta Moan and Ta Karbey temples, about 90 miles west of Preah Vihear.
Yingluck's government now has an opportunity to show that Thailand can co-exist peacefully with its neighbors. She will be helped by the close personal relationship her brother, exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, enjoys with Hun Sen, who appointed Thaksin in 2009 as an economic adviser to the Cambodian government, much to the Abhisit administration's chagrin. Yet the two men's friendship is as much a potential vulnerability as a strength, as Yingluck's political opponents will exploit any deal perceived as compromising Thai sovereignty. In 2008, pressure from Abhisit's Democrat Party forced then-Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama to resign for supporting Cambodia's efforts to have Preah Vihear listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, told WPR, "Getting too close to Hun Sen may open the door for [the PAD] to continue to politicize the issue. As long as Thailand cannot solve its domestic problems, the relationship with Cambodia will remain unstable."
Equally fraught is the fate of disputed oil and gas deposits in the Gulf of Thailand. A 10,000-square-mile swathe of offshore territory, known as the overlapping claims area, is estimated to contain some 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and a sizable quantity of oil. With billions of dollars at stake, several major extraction companies are already eyeing the prize, but the two sides have been unable to agree on a revenue-sharing agreement. Now, warmer relations make a deal more likely. At the same time, Thaksin's relations with Hun Sen will put the government at high risk of accusations of selling out.
Meanwhile, the government looks just as vulnerable in Thailand's deep south, which has been plagued by separatist violence that has at times poisoned relations with Malaysia. Thaksin's heavy handed treatment of the problem in 2004 brought the simmering conflict to a boil. Two massacres, at Tak Bai and at Krue Se mosque, remain emblematic of his gross mishandling of the insurgency. The military cited the rapid deterioration of the situation on Thaksin's watch as one reason for the coup that ousted him in September 2006.
Nevertheless, subsequent administrations -- not least the junta that ruled Thailand for a year following Thaksin's overthrow -- have scarcely proved better at handling the conflict. More than 4,700 people have been killed since 2004, and the past six months have seen a dramatic upsurge in violence. The credibility of the Democrats' oft-repeated claim that only they understand the south has been severely tested.
During a campaign visit to the region, Yingluck proposed granting autonomy to Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces, an idea long favored in some corners of academia. Yet in other quarters, most notably the Royal Thai Army and the Interior Ministry, such a solution remains unthinkable, constituting a break from the idea of a unified Thai state under the constitutional monarchy. Once again, the government runs the risk of being accused of betraying Thai sovereignty.
Perhaps inevitably, the Thaksin issue has already infected the Foreign Ministry. The appointment of Surapong Towijakchaikul as foreign minister had already raised eyebrows, given his lack of experience and relation by marriage to the Shinawatras -- his aunt is married to Thaksin's uncle. When it emerged that Surapong had made a personal request through the Japanese Embassy for Thaksin to be issued a special entry permit to visit Japan, he became a target. Claiming that Thailand's foreign minister was facilitating the travel of a convicted criminal, rather than seeking his extradition, the Democrat Party filed a police complaint against Surapong and launched a petition to have him impeached. The embattled minister filed countercharges, but the political damage was already done.
Many observers had expected the Yingluck government to work longer and harder to earn the public's trust before making its inevitable move to rehabilitate its exiled patron. Instead, the suspicion is growing that Thaksin's return is seen as a pressing priority. But with the wounds of the past five years still far from healed, it seems unlikely his enemies will stay passive for long. The seeds of Thailand's future unrest have been sown.
Dan Waites is a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
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