Unknown author
Sent to Khmerization by an anonymous reader.
Based on Thailand's past and present-day behavior in its territorial disputes, such an outcome of Thailand's forced conquest of Cambodian territory seems likely.
If contested land is the most common issue over which Thailand go to war, then Thailand’s opportunities for involvement in such conflicts have increased significantly. Although Thailand has participated in more territorial disputes than any other countries since the end of World War II, it has settled the majority of these conflicts through war before bilateral agreements, usually by uncompromising over the sovereignty of contested land. Thailand has used force in some of these disputes with Lao in 1987-1988, but it has generally not seized any amounts of land that it did not control before the outbreak of hostilities. Thailand has also used force in the disputes with Cambodia where it maintained a bit advantage in military power over the Cambodia side, 3 years gone by Thailand inability to capture any territory from Cambodia, suggesting paradoxically that Thailand may be more prone to the use of force over territory dispute with Cambodia in the future.
Past and future behavior,Thailand’s military rule, the instability associated with power shifts and the role of disputed territory between Cambodia, as a key source conflict nevertheless raise new questions about Thailand’s potential ambitions. Thailand started abrogate its past boundary agreements and initiate new territorial claims against Cambodia. Will Thailand use force in its unresolved disputes or in new disputes that it might initiate? In short, under what conditions might territorial conquest “pays” for Thailand?
Conquest is viewed increasingly as illegitimate and, as the Gulf War demonstrated, likely to be countered by the international community. Likewise, the globalization of production chains and the growing importance of intellectual capital in economic growth reduce the salience of territory as a component of national power. Resources may no longer be cumulative. Thailand has become increasingly integrated into the Asian community since 1990, embracing many of its norms, while its economic development and role in global production suggest that it might view territory as increasingly important. Thailand may not necessarily be more willing to compromise in its remaining territorial disputes, but it may be likely to use force and likely to press new claims.
The norm against conquest and the capitalist peace offer an optimistic view of the future, but whether Thailand will become more aggressive over territory nevertheless deserves rigorous examination. In this paper, assess the conditions under which Thailand will pursue territorial expansion, defined as either issuing new a territorial claim or using force in pursuit of an existing territorial dispute. In the analysis, a straightforward expected utility approach. Based on existing theories within international relations on state expansion, determine the potential benefits that Thailand might gain through territorial conquest. Then, examine Thailand’s ability to project military power to capture these benefits through the threat or use of force. the likely costs that Thailand would face for pursuing territorial expansion inside Cambodia.
One important caveat must be noted. This paper will not examine the conditions under which Thailand might use force in its most important dispute over 240,000km2 inside Cambodia territory, steady military modernization gives Thailand "greater coercive power in this conflict?", this dispute itself is less helpful in illuminating Thailand’s willingness to pursue expansion and use force over territory in the future. Moreover, Thailand's goal of nationalist unilateral map in the Preah Vihear temple has not been changes in Thailand . Instead, it has been pursued since the establishment From Siam to Thailand.
For Thailand , conquest is unlikely to pay. Overall, the expected benefits of territorial expansion are not as great as they might appear. Thailand’s ability to seize and control territory from Cambodia remains very limited, constrained largely by the limited strike ability of the Thailand’s Air Force and the lack of robust strategic airlift and sealift capabilities to deploy and sustain troops beyond its borders. The costs of territorial expansion, however, are clear, as it would signal to the region and the world a shift away from Thailand’s current grand strategy of reassurance and create incentives for Cambodia to form a military power to balance against Thailand.
Thailand’s past management of its territorial disputes provides a useful baseline for examining its potential for territorial war. Since 1950, Thailand has pursued mostly status quo goals in its territorial disputes. Thailand has un-compromised frequently in disputes on its land border and used force to signal resolve to defend these claims, But failed to seize any amounts of contested territory.
(L.C)
Sent to Khmerization by an anonymous reader.
Based on Thailand's past and present-day behavior in its territorial disputes, such an outcome of Thailand's forced conquest of Cambodian territory seems likely.
If contested land is the most common issue over which Thailand go to war, then Thailand’s opportunities for involvement in such conflicts have increased significantly. Although Thailand has participated in more territorial disputes than any other countries since the end of World War II, it has settled the majority of these conflicts through war before bilateral agreements, usually by uncompromising over the sovereignty of contested land. Thailand has used force in some of these disputes with Lao in 1987-1988, but it has generally not seized any amounts of land that it did not control before the outbreak of hostilities. Thailand has also used force in the disputes with Cambodia where it maintained a bit advantage in military power over the Cambodia side, 3 years gone by Thailand inability to capture any territory from Cambodia, suggesting paradoxically that Thailand may be more prone to the use of force over territory dispute with Cambodia in the future.
Past and future behavior,Thailand’s military rule, the instability associated with power shifts and the role of disputed territory between Cambodia, as a key source conflict nevertheless raise new questions about Thailand’s potential ambitions. Thailand started abrogate its past boundary agreements and initiate new territorial claims against Cambodia. Will Thailand use force in its unresolved disputes or in new disputes that it might initiate? In short, under what conditions might territorial conquest “pays” for Thailand?
Conquest is viewed increasingly as illegitimate and, as the Gulf War demonstrated, likely to be countered by the international community. Likewise, the globalization of production chains and the growing importance of intellectual capital in economic growth reduce the salience of territory as a component of national power. Resources may no longer be cumulative. Thailand has become increasingly integrated into the Asian community since 1990, embracing many of its norms, while its economic development and role in global production suggest that it might view territory as increasingly important. Thailand may not necessarily be more willing to compromise in its remaining territorial disputes, but it may be likely to use force and likely to press new claims.
The norm against conquest and the capitalist peace offer an optimistic view of the future, but whether Thailand will become more aggressive over territory nevertheless deserves rigorous examination. In this paper, assess the conditions under which Thailand will pursue territorial expansion, defined as either issuing new a territorial claim or using force in pursuit of an existing territorial dispute. In the analysis, a straightforward expected utility approach. Based on existing theories within international relations on state expansion, determine the potential benefits that Thailand might gain through territorial conquest. Then, examine Thailand’s ability to project military power to capture these benefits through the threat or use of force. the likely costs that Thailand would face for pursuing territorial expansion inside Cambodia.
One important caveat must be noted. This paper will not examine the conditions under which Thailand might use force in its most important dispute over 240,000km2 inside Cambodia territory, steady military modernization gives Thailand "greater coercive power in this conflict?", this dispute itself is less helpful in illuminating Thailand’s willingness to pursue expansion and use force over territory in the future. Moreover, Thailand's goal of nationalist unilateral map in the Preah Vihear temple has not been changes in Thailand . Instead, it has been pursued since the establishment From Siam to Thailand.
For Thailand , conquest is unlikely to pay. Overall, the expected benefits of territorial expansion are not as great as they might appear. Thailand’s ability to seize and control territory from Cambodia remains very limited, constrained largely by the limited strike ability of the Thailand’s Air Force and the lack of robust strategic airlift and sealift capabilities to deploy and sustain troops beyond its borders. The costs of territorial expansion, however, are clear, as it would signal to the region and the world a shift away from Thailand’s current grand strategy of reassurance and create incentives for Cambodia to form a military power to balance against Thailand.
Thailand’s past management of its territorial disputes provides a useful baseline for examining its potential for territorial war. Since 1950, Thailand has pursued mostly status quo goals in its territorial disputes. Thailand has un-compromised frequently in disputes on its land border and used force to signal resolve to defend these claims, But failed to seize any amounts of contested territory.
(L.C)
2 comments:
I love it
Battambang, Siem Reap, Bantheay MeanChey that Thailand had in mind and still want to have them back...?
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