Forbes Magazine,
23 January 2013
On January 3, President Obama and his defense team unveiled a new
global military posture focused on the Western Pacific. Although the
president was circumspect in explaining why the Pentagon is pivoting to
the Pacific, it’s pretty clear the main concern is China’s rising
influence in East Asia — the industrial heartland of the new global
economy. A document released at the January 3 event stressed that
America must maintain its economic and military access to the region.
For America, access to the area around China is mainly about sea
power. The U.S. can use satellites and long-range aircraft to overcome
the tyranny of distance, but it has relatively few bases in the region
and virtually no ground-force presence outside South Korea and Okinawa.
Since bases near China would probably be targeted early in any future
war, U.S. military presence depends mainly on warships at sea.
That raises the question of how vulnerable U.S. aircraft carriers
might be to attack by the Chinese air force and navy. The United States
has built its maritime force structure around a handful of giant
supercarriers, which have been deployed repeatedly to deter Chinese
military action against Taiwan. But with China’s double-digit economic
growth fueling a rapid buildup of long-range weapons, many experts have
begun to doubt the wisdom of deploying U.S. carriers anywhere near the
Middle Kingdom in wartime.
Obviously, there are many reasons why China would want to avoid a
war, especially one involving use of nuclear weapons. But accidents
happen, and the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to regional
allies hinge on how effective naval forces might be in a future
conflict. Since all the geographical advantages lie with China, it is
crucial to know whether the six or seven carriers that America could
deploy quickly to the Western Pacific would survive a Chinese
onslaught. If they are vulnerable, the war might be over very soon.
The first thing to understand about U.S. aircraft carriers is that
they are very big and very well defended. They displace 100,000 tons of
water, making them the biggest warships ever constructed, and their
four-acre decks hold dozens of multi-role fighters superior to anything
operated by China’s air force or navy. They typically are escorted by
cruisers or destroyers carrying the Aegis combat system — the world’s
most sophisticated air defense system — and nuclear-powered attack
submarines. Since the carriers themselves are nuclear-powered, they are
always moving and unconstrained by logistical needs.
However, it is precisely because the carriers are so big and capable
that they constitute such “lucrative” targets. Loss of a single carrier
would reduce U.S. naval air power by nearly ten percent, and might
entail thousands of U.S. casualties (over 5,000 personnel are typically
on board). It’s a lot easier to see a metal vessel that is twenty
stories high and three football fields long in the middle of an ocean
than it is to find a ground force hiding in the Ardennes. And if one
actually were destroyed, the psychological impact would be profound: the
United States hasn’t lost a carrier since the Hornet was sunk by Japanese dive bombers in 1942.
Carriers are much easier to disable than sink, since they have
thousands of watertight compartments and a typical bomb or torpedo lacks
the punch to send such a big ship to the bottom. But it is the
complete loss of a carrier that would devastate military capability and
morale, so that’s where the question of vulnerability is most critical.
With China gradually pushing its maritime defensive perimeter out into
the Pacific and deploying everything from nuclear-powered attack subs to
anti-ship ballistic missiles, isn’t it just a matter of time before
U.S. carriers have to retreat to a distance where their planes can no
longer reach China?
The answer to that question, it appears, is “no,” for at least four
reasons. First, whatever weapons China may be buying, it lacks the
sensors and command system to track and promptly target a carrier.
Second, U.S. forces have multiple options for actively and passively
impeding the effectiveness of any attack, including targeting forces
ashore. Third, if a carrier actually were hit by anything less powerful
than a nuclear weapon, it could absorb the damage and continue
operating in some diminished capacity; it almost certainly would not be
sunk. Finally, the U.S. Navy is taking numerous steps to enhance the
flexibility and effectiveness of its aircraft carriers, enabling them to
cope with whatever new capabilities the Chinese field.
With regard to tracking and targeting a carrier, it is important to
understand what a big place the Western Pacific is. The hotly contested
South China Sea measures over a million square miles, and it
constitutes only a small portion of the waters adjacent to Chinese
territory. While it might be possible for Chinese satellites, aircraft,
warships or land-based radars to detect a carrier there, it is quite
another thing to continuously track and precisely target the constantly
moving vessel. Satellites close enough to distinguish the carrier will
quickly disappear over the horizon, planes will run out of fuel or be
scared off by the carrier’s fighters, and other approaches produce
similarly spotty results. China will need to invest billions of dollars
over a period of many years before it has the assured capacity to find
and track U.S. carriers.
But as congressional naval expert Ronald O’Rourke pointed out in an
April, 2011 study, detection and tracking are just the initial steps in a
complex “kill chain” that Chinese forces must execute in order to
actually strike the carrier. Information must be conveyed, command
decisions must be made, weapons must be launched, and flight paths must
be traversed. Meanwhile, the carrier is moving, moving, moving —
probably in an evasive pattern that cannot be predicted in advance. So
Chinese weapons may end up arriving many miles from where the carrier
has moved to; or they may end up not arriving at all, because to get
anywhere near the ship, they must penetrate the densest point defenses
in the history of warfare.
These defenses begin with overhead surveillance and interception by
the Aegis combat system on escort vessels, by the carrier’s constantly
patrolling fighters that have their own highly sensitive radar plane
called the Hawkeye, and by a variety of other weapons scattered across
the fleet. The weapon systems are netted together so that a Standard
anti-aircraft missile launched by one U.S. warship can be guided by the
radar on another warship. The overhead defenses are complemented by a
similarly dense array of undersea defenses that include nuclear-powered
attack subs, ship-towed sonar arrays, and antisubmarine helicopters.
Collectively, these defenses will intercept the vast majority of Chinese
aerial and undersea weapons, most of which are not stealthy by U.S.
standards.
In addition to such active measures, the U.S. Navy has a variety of
passive measures for blunting any attack. For instance, China operates
satellites that, like their U.S. counterparts, can track surface vessels
by monitoring their electronic emissions. Items like radars and
communications antennas generate numerous signals that are helpful in
finding and identifying particular warships. However, the Navy has
numerous techniques for concealing or complicating these transmissions
so that they cease to be useful beacons in any attack. That facet of
defense is known as electronic warfare, and the U.S. Navy has long been
the global leader in exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum for both
offensive and defensive advantage.
However, no defense is perfect, so if China launches a large barrage
of missiles against a precisely targeted carrier, some may get through.
One Chinese weapon that has sparked much discussion in professional
journals recently is a new anti-ship ballistic missile with a
maneuvering warhead; the warhead’s combination of unpredictable movement
and high speed would be tough to intercept. It is not clear how
accurate such a warhead would be after maneuvering to avoid defenders,
but if it actually hit a supercarrier it would definitely impair flight
operations. Whether its kinetic punch is powerful enough to actually
sink a carrier is classified, but the fact the Navy hasn’t funded
development of systems to test possible defenses against it suggests
that the threat is not urgent.
Other new Chinese weapons like wake-homing torpedoes and sea-skimming
cruise missiles cause considerably less destruction, and probably would
not be able to sink the massive carriers. The warships are equipped
with heavy side armor, and their internal layout of numerous bulkheads
and watertight compartments would tend to keep damage localized. Crews
are trained continuously in firefighting and other emergency skills
relevant to limiting the effects of attacks.
Navy leaders tend to dismiss the most alarming reports about China’s
growing anti-access capabilities, pointing out that the country trails
the United States in almost every measure of naval power. For example,
China’s 60 attack subs seldom venture far from port, and tend to be
noisier — easier to detect — than those operated by the U.S. In any
event, the Navy is not sitting still waiting to see how the China
challenge evolves. It is funding numerous programs to stay ahead of the
threat, including the first all-new class of aircraft carriers in 40
years, more capable aircraft to be deployed on the carriers, major
upgrades in Aegis missile-defense capabilities, and increased production
of the very stealthy Virginia-class attack sub.
Such investments will give carrier captains additional options for
protecting their warships in the future. For instance, the carrier
version of the F-35 joint strike fighter will be able to fly 200-300
nautical miles farther with a bomb load than the plane it replaces, and
in a straighter line because it is stealthy; that means the carriers can
operate at much greater distances from Chinese shores while still
accomplishing missions. The latest version of the carrier-based Hawkeye
radar plane will provide improved sensitivity against threats like
cruise missiles, and a new electronic jamming aircraft called the
Growler will degrade the effectiveness of enemy radars and
communications. The Navy has literally dozens of such programs under
way, complemented by a training system that far exceeds the rigor
achieved in competing maritime forces.
None of this means that U.S. aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific
are invulnerable. As China’s military buildup proceeds, the U.S. Navy
will have to continually adjust its operating concepts and deployment
plans to keep up with the threat. But large-deck aircraft carriers are
likely to remain a potent contributor to U.S. power in the region, and
they will be joined in the future by Marine amphibious assault vessels
sporting their own improved aviation capabilities courtesy of the F-35
program. If military commanders avoid taking unnecessary risks, U.S.
aircraft carriers should retain their relevance to the balance of power
in the Western Pacific through mid-century.
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