US Involvement in Cambodian genocide: Realpolitik and National Tragedy in Repetition [extracted]

The US is leading the way in establishing its joint military programmes with most South East Asian nations including Cambodia. Ostensibly the exercises [such as this Angkor Sentinel workout] are limited to non-offensive aspects of a military campaign such as training on rescue and emergency contingency involving non-military and military personnel, but its long aim strategic intentions in the region are very much open to questions whilst its professed undertakings continue to be contradicted by the widespread abuses suffered by civilians at the hand of the very regime it is helping to strengthen through military co-operation- School of Vice [photo ARMY.MIL]

The UN does its part flirting with and bestowing its de facto recognition to powerful personalities despite their known abysmal human rights record and the certainty that this recognition will only give rise to more rights abuses. It is highly unlikely that any of these personalities will experience an epiphany or sudden change of heart - judging by on-going trend in rights abuses in the country and by the same co-opting approaches previously given to repressive Middle Eastern regimes - as a result of being made bedfellows of the US, the UN and other aid donors - School of Vice [UN Photo]

“Although the UN and U.S. were involved in rebuilding Cambodia through programs like the UNTAC from early 1992 to late 1993, it did not include the most essential component of rebuilding: recognition of the genocide and accountability.”

“For neither the first nor the last time, geopolitics trumped genocide.” 

by Jamie Sullivan

The Cambodian Civil War

The civil war consisted of the [Lon] Nol government and the U.S. on one side and the North Vietnamese (Viet Cong) and Cambodian communist revolutionaries (the Red Khmer) on the other. The Red Khmer later became the Khmer Rouge (KR) and was led by Saloth Sar (Pol Pot). The KR was educated in Paris and studied Maoist thought. China provided extensive military and political support to the KR.  Cambodia is one of the only countries in mainland Southeast Asia that has not been invaded or suppressed by China since the third century AD.  Although the KR originally formed in opposition to Sihanouk’s authoritarian rule, they later formed an alliance with Sihanouk against the Nol regime and his pro-American allies. The U.S. government supported Nol financially (with $1.85 billion) and militarily.  U.S. policy of supporting the Nol government during the civil war motivated the KR to commit genocide in 1975.

            The U.S. supported the Nol government despite the fact that he practiced corrupt, repressive, and brutal policies. In 1972, he declared that he was president, prime minister, defence minister, and marshal of armed forces.  As typical of the U.S. Cold War policy, the U.S. continued to support ABC governments (Anything But Communist) despite the fact that many of the governments practiced policies that went against American principles (e.g., freedom and democracy).  President Richard Nixon’s policy after his inauguration in 1969 became even more directly involved in supporting the Nol government, which was a continuation of supporting pro-U.S. and ABC governments.

Nixon, believing that the North Vietnamese were using the Ho Chi Minh trail to transport supplies, extended the war to Vietnam in eastern Cambodia. While the Ho Chi Minh trail did exist, Nixon’s strategy was ineffective. He led a secret bombing campaign (Operation Menu: Breakfast, Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Dessert, and Supper) in 1969 without Congressional approval.  On April 30, 1970, Nixon led a ground invasion of 31,000 American and 43,000 South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia. During the 200 nights of bombing from February to July in 1970, Peter Maguire reports that 15,000 pounds of explosives were released for every square mile of the Cambodian territory, totalling 540,000 tons.  The estimated amount of casualties “are difficult to estimate” and range from 5,000 to 500,000.  In 2000 President Bill Clinton released an extensive Air Force database on the American bombings of Indochina from 1964 to 1975. This database (which is still incomplete) revealed that from October 4, 1965 to August 15, 1973, approximately 2,756,941 tons of bombs were dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites in Cambodia. This reveals that the bombing began four years earlier than what is popularly believed. The amount of civilian casualties is most likely higher given the fivefold increase in the amount of bombs dropped.   Yet the bombing campaign and invasion forced the North Vietnamese further into Cambodia, in the process turning “uprooted Cambodian peasants into zealous revolutionaries.”  The end of the bombings and U.S. military and political support to Nol’s side of the civil war ended only with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1973 and with Nixon’s resignation.  U.S. involvement provoked the KR.

The civil war ended on April 17, 1975 when the KR captured the capital Phnom Penh. The estimated death toll is disputed and ranges from half a million to 1.7 million total.  During the civil war, the Nol regime committed mass atrocities (e.g. executions and cannibalism) against the KR and others.  The types of violence that the Nol forces employed motivated peasants to join the KR and to commit revenge killings.  The KR utilized similar techniques that the Nol government employed during the civil war (e.g. cannibalism against perceived enemies), which became even more severe during the genocide.  The animosity between the Nol government and the KR was due to clashing ideologies and their motivation to obtain power. The KR was anti-U.S. and communist; the Nol government was pro-U.S. and adhered to U.S. principles (e.g., capitalism). Both sides were authoritarian and committed human rights violations against one another. U.S. support of the Nol government during the civil war largely influenced the KR’s motivations to kill American allies and bystanders during the Cambodian genocide.

China’s Role in the Cambodian Genocide and U.S. Response

In 1978, the U.S. attempted to establish diplomatic relations with China. At the same time (from April to October), an NSC report was released that included updates on the mass atrocities taking place in Cambodia and recommended taking action. Congress had just passed the Dole-Solarz bill that allowed 15,000 Cambodian refugees from Thailand into the U.S. Representatives like McGovern advocated for armed intervention and insisted that condemning the KR be brought up with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Others, like Twining, believed that even the Chinese could not influence the KR’s behavior.  Eighteen representatives demanded that Carter make Cambodia a part of the bilateral negotiations with China. Assistant Secretary of State Douglas J. Bennet replied it would be a “serious mistake” that would, “seriously complicate this process without significant positive impact on the situation in Cambodia.”  Therefore, the U.S. government did not confront China about Cambodia.

National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was the main advocate for normalizing the U.S. relationship with China. Brzezinski continued the policy of non-condemnation of the KR when negotiating with the PRC, despite the fact that the PRC was the main military, economic, and political backer of the KR government. The disconsensus between Brzezinski and Carter’s opinions about the bilateral negotiations with China was documented through confidential papers and not revealed to the public.  Therefore, the public did not see the disagreement between them, which could have led to a reassessment of the way the public viewed U.S. policy. If any of the U.S. officials disagreed on the U.S. response to the Cambodian genocide, the disconsensus could have caused the public to question the government’s policies.  Yet the officials appeared to be in agreement. Jeopardizing the U.S.’s burgeoning relationship with China was to be avoided at all costs. All three administrations made clear geopolitical calculations of what was more important: ending the Cambodian genocide or expanding U.S. power (by avoiding intervention, which could led to humiliation and economic/military costs as well as the endangering the U.S. alliances with China and Thailand).

            During December of 1977, Pol Pot led numerous attacks on the Cambodian-Vietnam border. Although the Soviet Union had previously restricted investigations into the human rights atrocities in Cambodia due to its partnership with the KR, the Soviet Union changed their policy after Cambodian attacks on the Vietnam border. Vietnam began to document the KR massacres and increased their security on the border.  At the same time, the KR took measures to improve their public image in 1978 along with the support of China; Chinese leaders started a public relations campaign and produced propaganda films that showed the KR in a positive light. Foreigners were also welcomed back into the country.  The Chinese did this because they wanted to avoid condemnation from the international community because of the PRC’s support of the KR. In order to do this, the PRC led a campaign to make it appear as though the genocide never occurred.

The KR encouraged Asian and European countries to travel to Cambodia (in selective locations where genocide would not be witnessed). Elizabeth Becker, the correspondent in Cambodia for The Washington Post, and other reporters were allowed to interview Pol Pot. Yet the reporters were constricted to certain areas of Cambodia so that the story would be framed the way that the KR wanted it to be (as a non-genocidal regime). Malcolm Caldwell, one of the journalists that came with Becker and who believed that the KR was committing genocide, was murdered by the KR during his stay.  Almost every journalist that was discovered in the restricted press areas by the KR was killed or tortured during the genocide (as was done during the civil war).   The KR eliminated critical access to press coverage. Although the death of foreigners and journalists often receive special attention from the international community and the country of origin, the death of Caldwell did not draw mass attention to the genocide nor did it prompt a change in the international community or U.S.’s policy towards the KR.

During the genocide, the KR continued to have a seat in the UN. The UN did little to stop the genocide and saw the problem as consisting solely of the Vietnamese occupation, not the KR.  The UN General Assembly refused to allow the Cambodian “puppet regime” installed by the Vietnamese to have a seat at the UN.  Thus, the KR continued to hold a seat at the UN under a joint coalition in 1982 until the U.S. voted against the KR coalition in 1990. The KR flag continued to fly outside the UN.  In addition to giving legitimacy to the genocidal regime, the UN also pardoned the KR.

The UN and its member states never used the word genocide to describe the KR’s actions. The investigation into the situation in Cambodia was released in a report in 1985, which concluded that it was not genocide, although it was the worst thing to have happened since the Holocaust. U.S. officials did not consult the Genocide Convention* to see if it fit the atrocities in Cambodia.  The Paris peace accords (the agreement that ended the war in Vietnam) and the Paris Peace Agreements (which specified the duties of the United Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC, in 1991) did not include the words genocide either, but instead, “the universally condemned policies and practices of the past.”  Although Cambodia had ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, the KR was not held accountable to the convention it had signed. Gregory H. Stanton writes that the evidence is clear that the KR intended to destroy a group (such as the Cham, Buddhist monks, Vietnamese, Chinese, American lackeys, and other foreigners or foreigner sympathists) in whole and in part.  Thus, the evidence that Stanton and others have collected proves that the KR committed genocide.

What Can Be Done in the Future?

            Genocide can be prevented. In the situation of Cambodia, there were numerous signs that indicated that genocide might occur. Past genocides have often been preceded by oppression, years of interstate and/or civil war, nationalism, and racial hierarchies that support ethnic hatred (often as a result of colonial policy). There is a common pattern of the way in which the U.S. responds to genocide and the conflict that leads up to it. The U.S. frames the suspect country in a way that supports non-interventionism. In the case of Cambodia, refugee accounts were discounted as inaccurate, as the situation being unsolvable, or as supporting anti-communist propaganda. Other genocides like those in Rwanda, Bosnia, or Darfur have been framed as being irreconcilable because of the ancient ethnic hatred between the groups involved. The history of the conflict leading up to the genocide is purposely overlooked it would reveal that genocide is in fact preventable and often occurs out of a postcolonial, oppressive, or imperialistic context.

The genocide in Cambodia could have been prevented. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine changes the discussion of humanitarian intervention from the question of state sovereignty to a responsibility to protect the citizens whose state is unable to or unwilling to do so. There are three main strategies to deter genocide and violent ethnic conflict. First, and most ideal, is prevention. The Nixon administration had the intelligence that indicated that genocide might occur and could have used their involvement in Cambodia to prevent the genocide through previously mentioned methods (e.g., diplomatic, economic, and/or political means) to prevent the genocide. The second responsibility is to react. The Ford and Carter administrations failed to do this as well and did not employ the available measures that could have stopped the genocide. Multilateral military intervention should be considered a last resort, which is why prevention is essential. Carter could have responded militarily (through a UN peacekeeping mandate) to end the genocide like the Vietnamese did.

The third obligation is to rebuild.  Although the UN and U.S. were involved in rebuilding Cambodia through programs like the UNTAC from early 1992 to late 1993,  it did not include the most essential component of rebuilding: recognition of the genocide and accountability.

Conclusion

The U.S. played a significant role the Cambodian civil war, which influenced the KR’s motivation to commit “revenge” genocide. Yet U.S. policy towards the Cambodian genocide consisted of non-acknowledgement, non-condemnation of the KR, and not engaging in conversation or action that could have led to the dismantling of the genocidal regime. The U.S. was able to follow these policies because of three critical factors: the U.S. governments domination over intelligence (which enabled the government to frame the situation as not being genocide), the lack of evidence and information (e.g., absence of firsthand accounts and press access), and the way in which the Cold War political environment shaped the opinions of humanitarian activists. Revisionist historian Kenneth Clymer states that “by not linking the two issues [China’s relationship with Cambodia], American policy appeared to be based purely on realpolitik calculations and, in particular, a desire to play the China card in the strategic battle with the Soviet Union.”  The Ford and Carter administrations did not employ this strategy (one of many) that could have potentially led to the end of the Cambodian genocide. As Samantha Power notes, “For neither the first nor the last time, geopolitics trumped genocide.” 

Notes

 Article II of the Genocide Convention: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;


(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;


(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;


(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Source: ‘The Denial of Genocide: U.S. Policy Before and During the Cambodian Massacre’

Jamie Sullivan

Smith College

Gov 341

April 15, 2010