Abhisit vs. Hun SenAs the spat between Thailand and Cambodia reaches a stalemate, Alan Dawson looks behind the scenes
Published: 18/07/2011
Bangkok Post
US embassies around the region are closely following the Thailand-Cambodia confrontation, and believe Prime Minister Hun Sen touched off the conflict when he saw political gain in the waning days of the pro-Thaksin governments in late 2008.
Confidential US diplomatic cables flying between Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Jakarta and Washington, dated from 2008 to 2010, provide no evidence for the popular view that Hun Sen was goading Thailand to help the political fortunes of his friend, ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
The fresh views of the conflict from the US State Department come as the International Court of Justice ruled Monday on Cambodia's demand for an order forcing Thailand to withdraw all troops from the disputed territory around Preah Vihear temple. The court directed both countries to withdraw their troops from the disputed area.
Some 75 US diplomatic cables provided to the Bangkok Post by Wikileaks report that Phnom Penh put increasing military pressure and threats on Thailand as the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) demonstrated against the Cambodian policies of the Thaksin-backed governments in 2008.
See also: 'I report to Thaksin'
The US urged Thailand and Cambodia to solve the disagreement through bilateral talks, and feared United Nations interference would make the situation worse.
Diplomats describe the Thai reaction to a key meeting on Oct 13, 2008 when Hun Sen issued his first startling demand to then-foreign minister Sompong Amornvivat, that Thailand must withdraw all troops around the temple "if not tonight, then tomorrow".
"Thai Foreign Minister [Sompong Amornvivat] and Permanent Secretary [Virasakdi Futrakul] came away from the visit to Phnom Penh alarmed," reported the US charge d'affaires James Entwistle in a cable referenced 08BANGKOK3082 and dated October 14, 2008.
The Thai troops at issue were a 60-man unit trying to remove mines placed by Cambodian forces inside the disputed region around the temple.
"Sompong told [Mr Entwistle on] October 14 that Hun Sen had been blunt and taken a threatening approach during the October 13 meeting," the cable said. "Hun Sen had opened the meeting by telling Sompong that 'You are not going to like what I am going to tell you,' and then gave the ultimatum."
More than six dozen secret cables from Wikileaks detail the generally dismal and at times alarming relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh following that meeting.
After the Democrats took over government in December 2008, relations overall deteriorated further.
US diplomats in Bangkok and Phnom Penh reported no connection between the fate of fugitive ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ratcheting up of the conflict by Hun Sen. There is no indication in the cables that Thaksin's relations with the Cambodian leader led to the use of military force at the disputed border temple areas.
They note on the contrary that the first notable military action, in May, 2005, took place while "Thaksin and Hun Sen were amiably having dinner together in Bangkok at a welcoming event for the Miss Universe contestants", according to a cable referenced 05BANGKOK3333.
According to US analysts, Hun Sen seldom referred to Thaksin, but seemed to be motivated by hostile demonstrations and statements by leading Democrats and the PAD.
The low point in relations came in late 2009, when Hun Sen attacked Thailand during a visit to an Asean meeting, and invited Thaksin to visit Cambodia as an "economic adviser".
One urgent and classified cable, referenced 09BANGKOK2849 and dated Nov 6, 2009 described a meeting between Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Scot Marciel. One subject line summarises the 1,700-word report: "FM Kasit to DAS Marciel: Can you help with Hun Sen?"
Mr Marciel told Mr Kasit that the US "did not view Hun Sen's comments and naming of Thaksin [as an adviser] as aimed at improving relations" but that Washington wanted to be on good terms with both countries. He "hoped for a peaceful, bilateral resolution to the issue," the cable said.
Then-US ambassador Eric John — or a political officer — added that Thaksin and supporters may have engineered the Hun Sen invitation to visit Cambodia as a way to put pressure on Prime Minister Abhisit and the Democrat government.
"If that is indeed the case, the gambit seems to have backfired," the embassy told regional colleagues and Washington. Commentators and anti-government figures alike "have closed ranks in recent days in support of the government".
Mr Kasit told US officials Hun Sen's appointment of Thaksin on Nov 4 represented an "intervention in Thai domestic politics". He added that on Oct 24 on the sidelines of the Asean Summit, then-deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban had tried to impress upon Hun Sen the "gravity of inviting Thaksin to Cambodia as an adviser".
"Since the direct, private Thai appeal to Hun Sen to de-escalate the rhetoric and avoid unhelpful actions had failed, Kasit asked the [US government] to assist by suggesting to Hun Sen to 'stop this mad game'," the cable said.
Mr Kasit also offered the opinion that key to Hun Sen's thought process was that the return of Thaksin loyalists to government would allow him to benefit from "transactional diplomacy", including an end to the deadlock around the Preah Vihear temple and claims in the Gulf of Thailand.
"Mr Kasit suggested Hun Sen's frustration was based on falsely held beliefs that Preah Vihear could be developed into a tourist destination such as Disneyland and that the Democrat-led Thai government would not come to an agreement with Hun Sen over the territorial disputes," the cable said.
Published: 18/07/2011
Bangkok Post
US embassies around the region are closely following the Thailand-Cambodia confrontation, and believe Prime Minister Hun Sen touched off the conflict when he saw political gain in the waning days of the pro-Thaksin governments in late 2008.
Confidential US diplomatic cables flying between Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Jakarta and Washington, dated from 2008 to 2010, provide no evidence for the popular view that Hun Sen was goading Thailand to help the political fortunes of his friend, ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
The fresh views of the conflict from the US State Department come as the International Court of Justice ruled Monday on Cambodia's demand for an order forcing Thailand to withdraw all troops from the disputed territory around Preah Vihear temple. The court directed both countries to withdraw their troops from the disputed area.
Some 75 US diplomatic cables provided to the Bangkok Post by Wikileaks report that Phnom Penh put increasing military pressure and threats on Thailand as the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) demonstrated against the Cambodian policies of the Thaksin-backed governments in 2008.
See also: 'I report to Thaksin'
The US urged Thailand and Cambodia to solve the disagreement through bilateral talks, and feared United Nations interference would make the situation worse.
Diplomats describe the Thai reaction to a key meeting on Oct 13, 2008 when Hun Sen issued his first startling demand to then-foreign minister Sompong Amornvivat, that Thailand must withdraw all troops around the temple "if not tonight, then tomorrow".
"Thai Foreign Minister [Sompong Amornvivat] and Permanent Secretary [Virasakdi Futrakul] came away from the visit to Phnom Penh alarmed," reported the US charge d'affaires James Entwistle in a cable referenced 08BANGKOK3082 and dated October 14, 2008.
The Thai troops at issue were a 60-man unit trying to remove mines placed by Cambodian forces inside the disputed region around the temple.
"Sompong told [Mr Entwistle on] October 14 that Hun Sen had been blunt and taken a threatening approach during the October 13 meeting," the cable said. "Hun Sen had opened the meeting by telling Sompong that 'You are not going to like what I am going to tell you,' and then gave the ultimatum."
More than six dozen secret cables from Wikileaks detail the generally dismal and at times alarming relations between Bangkok and Phnom Penh following that meeting.
After the Democrats took over government in December 2008, relations overall deteriorated further.
US diplomats in Bangkok and Phnom Penh reported no connection between the fate of fugitive ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the ratcheting up of the conflict by Hun Sen. There is no indication in the cables that Thaksin's relations with the Cambodian leader led to the use of military force at the disputed border temple areas.
They note on the contrary that the first notable military action, in May, 2005, took place while "Thaksin and Hun Sen were amiably having dinner together in Bangkok at a welcoming event for the Miss Universe contestants", according to a cable referenced 05BANGKOK3333.
According to US analysts, Hun Sen seldom referred to Thaksin, but seemed to be motivated by hostile demonstrations and statements by leading Democrats and the PAD.
The low point in relations came in late 2009, when Hun Sen attacked Thailand during a visit to an Asean meeting, and invited Thaksin to visit Cambodia as an "economic adviser".
One urgent and classified cable, referenced 09BANGKOK2849 and dated Nov 6, 2009 described a meeting between Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya and visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Scot Marciel. One subject line summarises the 1,700-word report: "FM Kasit to DAS Marciel: Can you help with Hun Sen?"
Mr Marciel told Mr Kasit that the US "did not view Hun Sen's comments and naming of Thaksin [as an adviser] as aimed at improving relations" but that Washington wanted to be on good terms with both countries. He "hoped for a peaceful, bilateral resolution to the issue," the cable said.
Then-US ambassador Eric John — or a political officer — added that Thaksin and supporters may have engineered the Hun Sen invitation to visit Cambodia as a way to put pressure on Prime Minister Abhisit and the Democrat government.
"If that is indeed the case, the gambit seems to have backfired," the embassy told regional colleagues and Washington. Commentators and anti-government figures alike "have closed ranks in recent days in support of the government".
Mr Kasit told US officials Hun Sen's appointment of Thaksin on Nov 4 represented an "intervention in Thai domestic politics". He added that on Oct 24 on the sidelines of the Asean Summit, then-deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban had tried to impress upon Hun Sen the "gravity of inviting Thaksin to Cambodia as an adviser".
"Since the direct, private Thai appeal to Hun Sen to de-escalate the rhetoric and avoid unhelpful actions had failed, Kasit asked the [US government] to assist by suggesting to Hun Sen to 'stop this mad game'," the cable said.
Mr Kasit also offered the opinion that key to Hun Sen's thought process was that the return of Thaksin loyalists to government would allow him to benefit from "transactional diplomacy", including an end to the deadlock around the Preah Vihear temple and claims in the Gulf of Thailand.
"Mr Kasit suggested Hun Sen's frustration was based on falsely held beliefs that Preah Vihear could be developed into a tourist destination such as Disneyland and that the Democrat-led Thai government would not come to an agreement with Hun Sen over the territorial disputes," the cable said.
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