A Conflict in Perspective [from a Cambodian point of view]

Monday, May 09, 2011
Op-Ed by MP

From a cost-benefit perspective, the on-going Preah Vihear-border conflict is proving to be a rich source for speculation as well as providing all sides and interested elements with an open-ended invitation to put their particular (and often) reductive, not to mention partisan, spin on the issue. The complexity and protractedness of the conflict, especially when presented by a legal expert or wrapped in legal-speak, obfuscates the matter even more, and not unlike many a good murder mystery, the time and effort given to the process of unravelling the actual motives or the likeliest probability thereof, has been allowed, by way, perhaps, of unspoken mutual agreement (not necessarily between Phnom Penh and Bangkok since the fight itself is staged between two protagonists of vastly unmatched statures), to take precedence over the act of the Crime itself.

The murder victims here, apart from contested patches of land or claimed “sovereignty”, would be none other than the helpless civilians on both sides of the border, in particular, those on the Cambodian side where life has just started resuming a resemblance of normality and where civic means and emergency contingencies such as medical care, food and shelter at moments of crisis are being stretched to their limits.

Again just as in an absorbing murder mystery, the audience's attention contributes just as much to the prolonging of the tension and suspense in the drama through its series of improvised twists and sub-plots as do the plots themselves, each of which is as convincing and plausible as, or until, the unfolding of the next plot.

On the surface at least, Bangkok has succeeded in presenting the Preah Vihear conflict as one of unresolved legal issue, and its insistence that nothing, "not even the ground beneath the Temple itself" has been spelled out or defined in concrete legal terms has been repeated and footnoted in just about every international media report since 2008 when several thousand Thai troops moved into the so-called disputed areas adjacent the Temple. In fact, as most Cambodians will point out, this insistence on the part of Bangkok is merely a contrived move, designed with the international audience and media in mind, to deflect attention and scrutiny away from the actual Crime itself.

Likewise, one could argue that the Vietnamese - backed Phnom Penh regime also stands to gain something from this same scenario, since Hanoi has far more at stake in manipulating and fashioning Cambodia's affairs to suit its own agenda than has Bangkok in this tripartite arrangement. And one should note that the violent protest at the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh a few years back was anything but a spontaneous public outburst in response to rumoured remarks made by a Thai actress who could do better to widen her fan base than to have embroiled her name in the world of geo-politics. As Khieu Samphan (he was also stripped naked in public by Sihanouk's police) before that would testify, such demonstrations would have been carefully hatched and orchestrated by the powers that be with clear strategic motives behind them. Try imagining a similar protest or even peaceful gathering in front of the Vietnamese Embassy!

Yet, this does not or should not detract from the fact that the present armed conflict issued first and foremost out of Bangkok’s unilateral decision to despatch troops into an area it claims to be in “dispute”, reigniting, in so doing, a conflict its predecessors had created with Cambodia several decades before when Hanoi’s influence – or absence thereof - over post-colonial Cambodian regime of Prince Sihanouk would not have been a factor in the conflict’s dimension or its equation. Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea also clashed simultaneously with Thailand on the Western front and against Vietnamese forces in the East; an ill-timed adventure that led to the speedy demise of the DK regime, and a harsh lesson which may have left lasting psychological bearing upon the current CPP leadership.

Thus, the cost-benefit approach is useful to us (as detached or concerned observers) only to an extent, and it would be erroneous to base our understanding of the Cambodian-Thai conflict squarely upon the presumptive notion as to who stands to gain the most from it. However, if one were to go by the same approach, but ask instead who has the least to benefit from engendering or fermenting the conflict, the conclusion(s) that might be deduced would be just as interesting.

The fickle nature of politics and diplomacy is entirely congruous with the personalities and protagonists who ply their trade within these ignoble fields. These personalities and actors – from historical viewpoint – are comparable to passing puppet shadows that keep being projected onto the viewing canvas in a series of prolonged recurring battle scenes between larger, hidden and entrenched forces over colliding, rival ambitions of sparring states, as much as it is about settling any unfinished accounts that may have accrued between these states over the course of centuries past. The history of Preah Vihear itself encapsulates this turbulent relationship more succinctly than any rhetorical piece or contrived effort attempted so far by tendentious or partisan commentators, especially ones writing from the North-Western side of the Dangrek Range, where taught history has for hundreds of years been deliberately distorted and doctored to fit in with the supra-national mood and ideology of a vain, but calculating elite. (I apologise for eschewing the relevant dates and statistics, but curious readers could easily help themselves to such details, if need be).

It was Thailand’s blatant aggression and failure to observe or abide by international treaties (Franco-Siamese Treaties of 1904 and 1907) that eventually resulted in the ICJ verdict of 1962. The UNESCO’s decision in 2008 might have prompted the re-occupation of the area surrounding the Temple in the same year by the Thai armed forces, if not the Temple itself. But whatever Bangkok’s motives for sending troops to resolve any dispute it has with its neighbours, the inescapable fact remains that as in the 1950s, once again it has chosen to ride roughshod over existing international diplomatic and legal frameworks that are there for the purpose of settling such disputes between states without resorting to the use of physical force or violence.

In this respect, where wars or armed conflicts are commonly thought of as extensions of politics and diplomacy, or more precisely as a function of failed communication or dialogue, what one witnesses here is the preponderance of war or its threatening spectre being elevated over and above diplomatic dialogue, so that diplomacy itself must assume secondary importance and is made to function as an extension of war instead. Further, if Bangkok has genuine grievances vis a vis Phnom Penh over any treaty or map, or that the latter has not lived up to specific terms of the 2000 MOU etc., all it has to do is spell out its grievances before the hearing of an independent third party? If, however, it lacks the courage to do so, then why condemn or bemoan Cambodia for trying to “internationalise” or multilateralise the issue by insisting on using ‘bilateral mechanisms’ when these vehicles have so far yielded no fruitful outcomes?

Well, says FM Kasit Piromya, it all depends on one man on the other side; everything hinges on him. Thailand, he adds, is a democracy and a developed country economically, whereas Cambodia is quite the reverse, and we (Thailand) want to see Cambodia developed (!). Thank you. But knowing what an awful brute that person on the other side is (didn’t you once described him as a “thug” – or something?) then why do you insist on sitting down at the same table and in the same room with him without the presence of a third party? How do you help Cambodia to develop when your generals are amassing troops and heavy expensive military equipments of various sizes along the country’s border? Or do you rather prefer it that Cambodia – never mind an authoritarian regime or that one man - stands idly by on the sidelines for as long as it takes for Thailand’s ‘domestic endgame’ to run its course even if it means seeing Cambodia’s sovereignty being violated to no end in the process?

In the final analysis, I would venture to suggest that while both Phnom Penh and Bangkok may be finding it expedient to make the best use out of this armed conflict (as it offers both parties temporary diversion from their respective domestic woes), it is of greater benefit to the latter, but more of a risk for the former, to prolong and entertain it. Hence, the self-evident opposition, on the part of Bangkok, and in particular, its military branch – up to now – to proposed mechanisms that ought to logically help put this conflict to a halt such as the TOR outlined by Indonesia as well as Cambodia’s calls for international mediation effort.

Post Script:

In theory at least, the Paris Peace Accords established Cambodia as a UN protectorate, and as such the signatories to this treaty, if called upon, have an obligation to help defend or guarantee her territorial sovereignty. However, even without this landmark treaty, the UN still has an obligation to oversee any arising dispute between its member states. Yet the manner in which it delegated the responsibility to ASEAN - itself hardly equipped to do the job due to the overlapping interests and mistrusts permeating among its members, and this has been the principal reason why Thailand has been able to fudge the issue and get away with not having to commit itself to serious attempt at a settlement for so long. In this sense, Hun Sen’s recent outburst directed at his Thai counterpart is well meant and long overdue! - signals its reluctance to become embroiled in another regional spat between Asians.

Nonetheless, Phnom Penh deserves credit for taking the initiative in search of peaceful resolution by taking the issue to the UNSC, and lately, to the World Court - venues where many critics had thought it would not explore.