A Change of Guard

សូមស្តាប់វិទ្យុសង្គ្រោះជាតិ Please read more Khmer news and listen to CNRP Radio at National Rescue Party. សូមស្តាប់វីទ្យុខ្មែរប៉ុស្តិ៍/Khmer Post Radio.
Follow Khmerization on Facebook/តាមដានខ្មែរូបនីយកម្មតាម Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/khmerization.khmerican

Friday 23 July 2010

Thailand Military Change of Guard – A New Era of Cooperation or Increasing Hostility


By Davan Long,
Friday, July 23, 2010

For military observers and analysts, it is no surprised that this year Thailand democrat-led coalition government is in an unusual hurry to complete its annual military reshuffling, and that the Royal Government of Cambodia is closely watching this event due to its real potential to further severe the already-tense bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Usually each year in August/September, the commanders of Thai armed forces submit their reshuffle lists, which recommend the promotions and appointments of senior officers to key positions, to the Defence Minister through the defence permanent secretary. The Prime Minister and his cabinet will then review and finalize the list before sending it to the Privy Council for royal endorsement.

In a haste move, Defence Minister General Prawit Wongsuwon has instructed that this year’s military reshuffle lists be submitted to the defence permanent secretary, General Apichart Penkitti, no later than July 20. With this new deadline, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva would be able to forward the final list for royal blessing by the end of August, a month ahead of the usual schedule.

One plausible hypothesis for such a rush is that the Constitution Court, as requested by the Election Commission, may dissolve PM Abhisit Vejjajiva’s political party for allegedly violating Political Party Act in 2005 by receiving a 258 million bath donation through a third party, as well as for allegedly misusing 29 million baths of political development fund. PM Abhisit Vejjajiva is also facing possible impeachment proceedings over a string of other allegations under investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Agency.

Another possible hypothesis is that knowing that his government may not survive the pending allegations, PM Abhisit Vejjajiva may attempt to boost his much-needed credibility by unilaterally calling an early election. Whatever the scenario is, the ultimate goal of his government is to ensure that it can complete the military reshuffle before the next general election. In fact, that was arguably the main reason why he refused to call general election immediately as demanded during the red-shirt protests, instead offering to hold it in November 2010.

The outcome of this year military reshuffle will shape Thai political landscape for years to come, and Prime Minster Abhisit Vejjajiva is clearly determined to get anti-Thaksin, ultra-royalist army generals into dominating military positions. In case his party does not emerge as the winner in the next elections, those army generals can decisively exert influences over the formation of the coalition governments. That was precisely what Generals Prawit, Anupong and Prayuth did to “persuade” other parties to leave the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to form the coalition government with the Democratic Party. Indeed, one could further argue that without the continued backing from the military, PM Abhisit Vejjajiva’s coalition government would have succumbed to the red-shirt protests.

The most anticipated outcome in this year military reshuffling is the compulsory retirement of General Anupong Poachinda who has been the army Commander-in-Chief since 2007, and the appointment of his deputy, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a known favorite of the Royal Palace, as a successor. If his promotion is confirmed, General Prayuth Chan-ocha could essentially remain in the army’s top job till 2014, at which time he will reach the mandatory retirement age of 60.

Graduates from Pre-Cadet Class 12, General Prayuth Chan-ocha is a long time close friend and protégé of General Anupong Poachinda. He previously held the positions of Commander of the First Army Region, and Army Chief-of-Staff before getting promoted to his current position. Like General Anupong, General Prayuth has also commanded the high profile Queen’s Guard Second Division.

Together with General Anupong, General Prayuth played key role in the 2006 putsch that ousted Thaksin in 2006, and later at the peak of army internal rift, the alliance between Prawit (pre-Cadet Class 6), Anupong (Pre-Cadet Class 10) and Prayuth, known as “Eastern Tigers” pack, was seen as a stabilizing force for the irreconcilable differences between military factions.

Ironically, the Anupong-Prayuth fraternity appeared to take a different turn during the red-shirt protests as the latter inserted his hawkish influences at the Center of Resolution for Emergency Situation (CRES). There was unconfirmed rumor that General Prayuth was contemplating “half coup” to remove General Anupong while keeping Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva coalition government intact. General Prayuth categorically denied the allegation. However, in a country like Thailand, which had gone through eighteen military coups since becoming a Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, any rumor on military coup, no matter how improbable it was, could not be entirely dismissed. On that note, it is arguable that if General Prayuth does become the Army Commander-in-Chief, it is likely because of his close tie with the 90 years-old retired General Prem Tinsulanonda, presently President of the Privy Council, as well as his good working relationship with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

During the red-shirt protests in April and May this year, General Prayuth was seen as not only adamantly anti-Thaksin but also a hardliner who advocated tough military actions against the red-shirts, in stark contrast to General Anupong who publicly favored political over military solution and refused to take harsh military actions against the protesters.

If General Prayuth does get promoted to the army top job, the democrat-led coalition government, which seems to neither trust nor have control over the police, will enjoy the much-needed unreserved backing from the military to crack down hard on the pro-Thaksin movement. However, tough military actions can backfire the government as it will likely drive the pro-Thaksin movement into deeper and possibly better organized underground movement.

It is too soon to state that having General Prayuth at the helm of the army will provide greater stability for Thailand ongoing socio-political unrest. The rapid and meteoric rise of General Prayuth and his clique (Pre-Cadet Class 12) has been widely perceived as at the expense of more professional soldiers belonging to different cliques or serving in less royally decorated units. Top generals and commanders who feel their careers were sidelined or wrecked by Pre-Cadet Class 12 are prone to become watermelon soldiers (green outside, red inside), a popular expression for referring to the soldiers who sympathize with the red-shirt protesters. A number of these disfranchised generals, some of whom have undying loyalty to Thaksin, may secretly support the red-shirts leaders currently in hiding or actively working underground. In fact some government officials strongly suspect that the black-clad militants who fought along side the red-shirt protesters were soldiers from rival units.

The appointment of General Prayuth as army chief is likely to further complicate the already strain relationship between Cambodia and Thailand. It would not be a surprise if some speculations have already been circulated in the current Thai coalition government and military leadership that the red-shirts could use Cambodia soil as a training camp to mount anti-government activities. Such speculations could easily lead to serious, though false, accusations. There is also a concern that the new army chief may force the Preah Vihear issue with Cambodia to defuse the domestic political unrest and internal rivalry between army factions.

Facing with these looming volatilities, it would be prudent for the Royal Government of Cambodia to remain cautious and adopt the “don’t provoke, don’t fear” policy vis-à-vis Thailand.

No comments: