A burnt out tank and people escaping from the fighting on 5-6 July 1997.
By Brad Adams
Published in:
Phnom Penh Post
What happened in Cambodia on July 5-6, 1997?
Thomas Hammarberg, the United Nations Special Representative on Human
Rights in Cambodia, made it clear in his October 1997 report to the UN
General Assembly: the events of July 5-6 were a "coup d'état."
This seemed plain to those of us living through those tumultuous times
in Cambodia, and has been confirmed by subsequent research. Through
interviews at the time and in the years since with senior CPP and
FUNCINPEC officials, senior military officials of the CPP, FUNCINPEC
and KPNLF, diplomats, foreign military attaches, human rights workers,
and residents of Phnom Penh who witnessed the fighting, the basic facts
are clear.
The evidence shows that this was not a CPP coup, but a coup by Hun Sen.
Other senior CPP figures, including party president Chea Sim, Interior
Minister Sar Kheng, Defense Minister Tea Banh, and head of the armed
forces Ke Kim Yan, argued against military action and refused to
mobilize their forces, causing deep strains in the party. After the
coup, many senior CPP officials who refused to participate sandbagged
their homes and put their guards on full alert, fearful that Hun Sen
would then strike against them for their disloyalty.
Even without the support of much of his party, Hun Sen was able to put
together enough military power to succeed. On July 5-6 his ad hoc
forces, led by loyalists including Kun Kim, Mol Roeup, Sao Sokha, Hok
Lundy, and Keo Pong, defeated the FUNCINPEC forces who had not been
disarmed in the previous week. He then unleashed his forces to carry out
a campaign of extrajudicial executions, primarily of FUNCINPEC
military officers.
I and many of my colleagues at the UN human rights
office had the unforgettable experience of digging up the bodies of men
stripped naked to their underwear, handcuffed behind their backs,
blindfolded, and shot in the head.
Executions and torture
In many cases it was clear who carried out these killings. One unit in
particular, the "911" parachute regiment under Colonel Chap Pheakadey,
was clearly responsible for a series of executions and torture. The
government has never opened an investigation or made efforts to
prosecute Pheakedey or any other perpetrators. Instead of being
prosecuted, Pheakadey is now a General. Donors and diplomats who say
they are committed to the fight against impunity have simply dropped the
issue.
What caused the coup? Many trace it back to the flawed power sharing
formula after FUNCINPEC won the UNTAC-organized elections in May 1993.
The CPP insisted on an equal share of power and refused to relinquish
control of the security services. The international community and then
Prince Norodom Sihanouk imposed a coalition with Prince Norodom
Ranariddh and Hun Sen as co-Prime Ministers. The CPP's successful threat
to use force if its conditions were not met may have emboldened Hun
Sen to use military force if his hold on power was ever threatened
again.
One could also point to the failed coup attempt of July 2, 1994 against
Hun Sen and Ranariddh - by members of Hun Sen's own party. This coup
attempt was led by former Minister of Interior Sin Song and national
police chief Sin Sen, both of whom were furious at Hun Sen for being
left out of the coalition government. The coup attempt was backed by
Thaksin Shinawatra's IBC TV, after his television contract was ripped up
by the co-Prime Ministers. Ironically, Hun Sen was saved in part by
Ranariddh and FUNINCPEC forces under General Nhek Bun Chhay, who sent
their forces to confront rebel CPP tanks motoring in from their
stronghold in Prey Veng.
A party divided
Hun Sen learned a huge lesson that day: he could not trust his party to
protect his personal security. The price Hun Sen exacted from the CPP
coup plotters and their patrons was greater control of the armed forces.
He appointed his own man, Hok Lundy, as national police chief. Until
then internal security had been Chea Sim's domain. Hok Lundy reported
directly to Hun Sen despite the fact that his formal boss was Sar Kheng -
a close confidante of Chea Sim and an internal party opponent of Hun
Sen. Perhaps even more important, Hun Sen decided to build up his
personal "bodyguard unit" into a de facto private army. All of this soon
made Hun Sen the strongest physical force in the CPP. Hok Lundy and
the bodyguard unit played key roles in the July 1997 coup.
One could also point to Ranariddh's decision in early 1996 to confront
the CPP. The CPP had reneged on a promise to appoint FUNCINPEC members
to half the district chief positions in the country, a key part of the
1993 coalition agreement. There was deep dissatisfaction in FUNCINPEC
over the lack of real power sharing (and the opportunities for
corruption that came with it) and the party's clearly second-class
status in the government. Ranariddh had shown himself to be a weak and
incompetent leader. His party was losing public esteem as it failed to
implement any of its 1993 campaign promises on corruption, human rights
or land. Ranariddh decided that FUNCINPEC should attempt to reach
military parity with the CPP. It was a ridiculous idea to compete with
Hun Sen and the CPP in military terms, "laughable," as many foreign
military attachés later told me.
Long before July 1997, Hun Sen had tried but failed to convince his
party to authorize military action against FUNCINPEC. His intentions
were discerned as early as April 1996 by the UN political representative
in Cambodia, Benny Widyono. Widyono warned in a cable to UN
headquarters that Hun Sen was contemplating getting rid of Ranariddh.
After meeting Hun Sen, Widyono concluded that Hun Sen was mapping out
his "usual strategy: to patiently probe Prince Ranariddh's weaknesses
and, when the time comes, to strike at those weaknesses, swiftly and
aggressively." Widyono believed that Hun Sen was angling to arrest
Ranariddh.
Two days later, reacting to a threat by FUNCINPEC to dissolve the
National Assembly and call early elections, Hun Sen warned that he might
use military force, declaring, "I have the forces to do it." According
to another cable from Widyono, Hun Sen wanted to arrest FUNCINPEC
generals, but was blocked by the opposition of CPP armed forces chief Ke
Kim Yan. A further report from Widyono's office stated that at a
secret April 30, 1996 meeting of CPP leaders, Hun Sen proposed taking
military action against the FUNCINPEC "machinery." This was reportedly
opposed by most CPP leaders, including Ke Kim Yan, Chea Sim, and Sar
Kheng. General Pol Sarouen, Kandal deputy governor Kun Kim and Phnom
Penh deputy governor Chea Sophara were reported to support Hun Sen. In
June 1996 Chea Sim felt it necessary to publicly air his concerns,
stating that there should be no confrontation between CPP and
FUNCINPEC.
By the beginning of 1997, the coalition government was falling apart.
About the only thing the two parties had in common was a rapacious
appetite for wealth gained through high-level corruption. Ranariddh and
Sam Rainsy, head of the opposition Khmer Nation Party (KNP), now agreed
to work together to defeat the CPP in the 1998 elections.
Political factions
In February 1997 fighting broke out between FUNCINPEC and CPP forces in
Battambang province. An "Abnormal Conflict Resolution Committee" was
established to prevent a recurrence. It was chaired by co-Ministers of
Interior Sar Kheng and You Hokry (FUNCINPEC) and included Ke Kim Yan and
Nhek Bun Chhay. None of these people had the power to block Hun Sen
when he decided to use military force. At the same time, CPP officials
say that Hun Sen was deeply concerned that the more moderate Sar Kheng
was being promoted through the "Abnormal Committee" as his successor by
some in the CPP, FUNCINPEC and some diplomats.
By this time Hun Sen's popularity was rapidly declining in the country
and within his own party. There were frequent press reports about deep
splits in the CPP between the Hun Sen and Chea Sim-Sar Kheng factions,
with many in the party wanting to replace Hun Sen with someone they
considered more palatable to voters.
Fearing the newly announced alliance between FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy's
KNP, Hun Sen wanted to arrest Rainsy, who was busily building his new
party. Minister of Justice Chem Snguon confirmed this to me, saying that
Hun Sen had asked him to arrest Rainsy. According to Snguon, no fan of
Rainsy, "I told him, 'How could I? I didn't have any grounds.'"
The March 30, 1997 grenade attack on a KNP rally led by Rainsy, which
killed 16 and injured more than 150, soon followed. Hun Sen reacted by
ordering Rainsy's arrest. The demand was so outrageous - Rainsy was
nearly killed in the attack - that the order was ignored.
In early April Hun Sen engineered a split within FUNCINPEC in an attempt
to gain sufficient votes in the National Assembly to remove Ranariddh
as Prime Minister. This was not difficult, as many FUNCINPEC MPs were
deeply disaffected from Ranariddh. At one point Hun Sen claimed 22
FUNCINPEC "neutrals" would vote against Ranariddh. But after leaving Hun
Sen's home at Tuol Kraisang many of the MPs recanted, some going into
hiding. The attempt to remove Ranariddh through "legal" means failed.
Coup rumors swirled. On April 28, 1997, Hun Sen announced that he had
nothing to gain from a coup as he already held full power legitimately,
but warned, "If I decide to hold a coup d'etat, it can hardly be
prevented." He was right.
Fallout factors
The FBI was sent to investigate the March 30 grenade attack because an
American, Ron Abney, was injured and it was classified as a terrorist
attack by the State Department. By May 15, the investigation had
implicated Hun Sen's bodyguard unit, not least because it allowed the
grenade throwers through its lines to escape before turning its guns to
stop those giving chase. Investigations showed that Hok Lundy's police,
who normally were deployed at demonstrations, were ordered to stand
down that morning. The lead FBI agent told the Cambodian police that
things looked "very bad" for Hun Sen, especially since "Hun Sen's
people didn't tell the truth." This was reported back to Hun Sen.
On May 25, a large shipment of arms signed for by Ranariddh for his
bodyguard unit arrived at Kampong Som port. The CPP-controlled military
court opened a case against Ranariddh. Hun Sen accused Ranariddh of
trying to import weapons illegally and destabilizing the government. It
is unclear if this shipment was legal, but what is certain is that the
CPP, like FUNCINPEC, was regularly importing arms and weapons without
informing the other side. "This was routine and both sides knew about
it," a senior CPP official told me, a point confirmed by many other CPP
and FUNCINPEC officials and military attachés from France, Singapore,
Thailand, and the United States.
During this time both FUNCINPEC and the CPP began to move forces into
and around Phnom Penh in anticipation of armed conflict. Both were also
attempting to strike a deal with remaining Khmer Rouge forces in the
north of the country (Ieng Sary and other Khmer Rouge forces in western
Pailin and Malai areas had defected to Hun Sen, who outbid Ranariddh,
in August 1996). Hun Sen accused FUNCINPEC of bringing Khmer Rouge
soldiers from Khmer Rouge headquarters in Anlong Veng into Phnom Penh,
giving massive air time to a former Khmer Rouge fighter named Phon
Pheap, who alleged Nhek Bun Chhay was hiding large numbers of Khmer
Rouge at the FUNCINPEC base near the airport at Tang Kraisang. Ranariddh
fed these claims by engaging in ham-fisted and desperate negotiations
with Khieu Samphan to defect and bring his forces, Ieng Sary-style, to
the FUNCINPEC side.
I was part of a team of UN staff who interviewed alleged Khmer Rouge
soldiers captured after the coup. We found only a few who may have been
Khmer Rouge, but most were farmers from Prey Veng or Svay Rieng who had
been offered money to come to Phnom Penh for work. This is not to say
there were none. In May 1997 I saw two Khmer Rouge soldiers guarding a
safe house for FUNCINPEC "neutral" MPs in Phnom Penh. They had the look
of jungle fighters and said they were from Malai. There were other
anecdotal reports of Khmer Rouge forces coming to join FUNCINPEC.
However, no credible evidence of the presence of significant numbers of
Khmer Rouge members from Anlong Veng has ever been produced. French,
Australian and Singaporean military attaches told me the claims were
unfounded. On the other hand, as many as 300 former Khmer Rouge fighters
fought in the coup on Hun Sen's side under the command of Khmer Rouge
defector Keo Pong.
Blood feud
In mid-June, forces under the command of Hok Lundy and FUNCINPEC deputy
Minister of Interior Ho Sok fought along Norodom Boulevard in Phnom
Penh. Two FUNCINPEC troops were killed. The tension in Phnom Penh was
intense, with many expecting armed conflict to break out at any time.
However, many others believed that Hun Sen would be blocked by others in
his own party. These optimists, including many diplomats and some in
FUNCINPEC, were wrong.
In late June, Hun Sen again attempted to convince CPP leaders to back
his plans to take power by force. Those present at the meeting say that
this was strongly opposed by Ke Kim Yan, Tea Banh, Chea Sim and Sar
Kheng. They argued that FUNCINPEC was not a military threat and that
while it might have been bringing some Khmer Rouge into Phnom Penh, the
number was not significant. They argued that the country had made too
much progress since the Paris Peace Agreements to put it all at risk,
and that they would be blamed by the international community and
Cambodians if they used force to solve political problems.
On June 29 Hun Sen announced that he would no longer cooperate with
Ranariddh. He demanded that members of the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh
surrender to his forces or face tough action. On the same day, CPP
General Pol Sareoun told a foreign historian that unless Ranariddh was
arrested, there was soon going to be a "little war" with FUNCINPEC. That
same day, the Washington Post quoted an FBI report alleging that Hun
Sen's bodyguards were involved in the March 30 grenade attack.
Credible reports began to come in that CPP tanks were being positioned
around Phnom Penh, while FUNCINPEC consolidated its forces in Taing
Kraisang. One western military attaché with close contacts in the CPP
told me that he briefed his embassy on how the tanks would be deployed
into Phnom Penh, how they would take FUNCINPEC military installations,
and how they would secure radio and TV stations.
Ranariddh flees
On July 1, the military court asked the National Assembly to lift
Ranariddh's parliamentary immunity so it could charge him with illegal
weapons smuggling. On July 2, CPP forces seized FUNCINPEC's Prek Ta Ten
base along route 5 north of Phnom Penh, killing one FUNCINPEC soldier
and wounding three.
On July 3, Ranariddh returned to Phnom Penh from Kampong Cham by
helicopter after he was told that an operation was afoot to arrest him
en route. His bodyguards drove to Phnom Penh. Along the way, pro-Hun Sen
troops stopped them and gave them the choice of being shot or
disarmed. According to an American official, the CPP forces involved
said they hoped to provoke a fight and were unhappy that Ranariddh's
bodyguards did not take the bait. Ranariddh fled to France the next
day, July 4, after being warned by his security officials that Hun Sen
would try to arrest or kill him.
Negotiations throughout that night between Nhek Bun Chhay and CPP
military leaders, including Ke Kim Yan and Tea Banh, proved fruitless.
FUNCINPEC military figures wanted assurances that if they grouped in
Taing Kraisang they would continue to be recognized as members of the
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and would not be harmed. Hun Sen demanded
that they disarm, but Nhek Bun Chhay refused, fearing that he and his
forces would be killed - which is what happened to many after the coup.
By the morning of July 5, Hun Sen's forces were ready to strike at Taing
Kraisang, a small FUNCINPEC base next to the airport, the homes of
officers like Nhek Bun Chhay and Chau Sambath, FUNCINPEC party
headquarters, and Ranariddh's home in central Phnom Penh. By the end of
the next day, FUNCINPEC's forces were routed.
Aftermath
The 1997 coup has been by far the most important event in Cambodia since
the 1993 UNTAC elections. It shattered all illusions that the country
was on the path to democracy. It showed that violence was still an
acceptable political choice for the country's leaders. It showed
indifference to the lingering trauma and fear that so many Cambodians
retained after the Khmer Rouge period and the bloody 1993 UNTAC
elections. It made clear that commitments to human rights were just
words on paper.
The widespread and planned post-coup extrajudicial executions of
FUNCINPEC military figures carried out by Hun Sen's forces took place
under the international community's noses and underlined continuing
impunity for the most serious human rights violations. Even the most
blatant abuses, such as the murder of Ho Sok in the custody of the
forces of Hok Lundy in an interior ministry office, have gone
uninvestigated and unpunished.
More than anything, the coup and Hun Sen's successful navigation of the
ensuing domestic and international political fallout, culminating in
the CPP's defeat of the political opposition in 1998's fundamentally
flawed election and Hun Sen's subsequent success in seeing off the Chea
Sim-Sar Kheng faction in his own party, set the country on the course
to Hun Sen's almost total dominion over political and military power in
Cambodia. No one now believes (as a few did at the time), for example,
that if an opposition party obtained more votes than the CPP that Hun
Sen would relinquish power.
The coup, therefore, stole something intangible yet essential: it stole
hope from people who had just begun to dare to dream that their future
would be decided by the ballot instead of the bullet.
Brad Adams is Asia director at Human Rights Watch.
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