The Khmer Rouge had considered killing Sihanouk

By Khmerization

18th February, 2012

Of late, many local media reported that Mr. Khieu Samphan, head of state of the Khmer Rouge regime, has allegedly accused ex-King Sihanouk (pictured) of ordering the executions of two leftist Khmer Rouge leaders Hou Youn and Hu Nim during the Khmer Rouge regime.

Kong Sam Onn, Mr. Khieu Samphan's counsel, has outright rejected the allegation and Mr. Julio Jeldres, official biographer and advisor to Sihanouk, has also repudiated the allegation in a letter to the Phnom Penh Post which was also published in Khmerization.

Now, Mr. Bora Touch, a Cambodian-born lawyer from Sydney, has joined the fray in defending the ex-king with convincing evidence: The Minute of the Meeting of the Khmer Rouge Permanent Committee. Here is his message sent to Khmerization and his academic friends:

Gentlemen,

Hou Youn was killed sometime in late 1975 and Hu Nim in May 1977. I have [Hu] Nim's confessions (he wrote his confessions, in part, in poetic, phonoaesthetic form). [Hu] Nim was implicated by previous Tuol Sleng victims. His death had nothing to do with HRH Sihanouk. [Hou] Youn's death is still rather controversial. In my "chats" with Khieu Samphorn and Nuon Chea in 2005, both suggested he was not killed by Angkar. Both suggested that his bodyguards killed him. Of note, after his death, official documents still referred to him in friendly comradeship terms, suggesting that he was not regarded as a traitor to the revolution. You would have heard contemptible references such as ah Hu Nim, ah Sao Phim, after they were killed. These guys were "traitors" to the revolution.

Of note, HM had already resigned in March 1976, over a year before Hu Nim was arrested and killed. Talks/decisions by the CPK (Communist Party of Kampuchea) Standing Committee/Politburo about what to do with the Prince, including killing Prince Sihanouk, took place on 11-13 March 1976 in the Meeting of the Committee in which Khieu Samphorn (Hem) attended and discussed about the issue (first and last pages of the Minute is attached).

Nuon Chea, when asked about [Hou] Youn's death, recently stated in court that Hou Youn had "problems with his bodyguards".

regards Bora-

Mr. Bora also included the Minute of the Meeting of the Khmer Rouge Permanent Committee, which at the time, considered a number of options, including killing Sihanouk after he had resigned as the head of state. Here is the minute of that meeting:

KR wanted to kill Sihanouk2-Minute of 11 Mar 1976 Meeting of CPK Poliburo 2-4

[Unofficial translation by Bunsou Sour; edited by Prof. David Chandler]

MINUTE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE THE FRONT

11 March 1976

PARTICIPANTS: COMRADE SECRETARY GENERAL [Pol Pot]

COMRADE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL [Nuon Chea]

COMRADE VORN [Vorn Vet]

COMRADE KHIEU [Son Sen]

COMRADE HEM [Khieu Samphan]

COMRADE DOEUN ( Seu Doeun or Seu Vasy)

COMRADE TUM

COMRADE TOUCH (note taker)

AGENDA: SIHANOUK'S RESIGNATION FROM HIS POST

I. Report on the Resignation of Sihanouk

Comrade HEM reported to the Standing Committee on the resignation of Sihanouk. Sihanouk has sent two letters written in French:

· The first letter conveys his resignation and explains the important reason for which he is resigning. In particular, he emphasizes his various health problems, which do not allow him to continue his work.

· The second letter is a statement addressed to the people of Democratic Kampuchea informing them that he wishes to resign from his post before the 20th March 1976. During his meeting respectively with the Ambassadors of Mauritania and Senegal, Sihanouk has also indicated that he categorically resigns. But during his meeting with the Chinese Economic Delegation he grumbled about his illnesses...

II. Angkar's Opinion

1. Reason for his Resignation.

There are two: in the long term and in the short term.

A. In the Long Term: it is the difference of "classes", the difference between the grass roots of the Revolution and his own person and family. He cannot live with us. If in the past he was able to remain with us, it was simply because of his strategy. As we no longer go along with his strategy, he can onlyremain provisionally with us. It is not the first time that Sihanouk has resigned. He did that in 1971 already.

B. In the Short Term: It is a strategic difference together with the grass roots difference. An example was the case when we dispatched our Ambassadors abroad without consulting him. The incident has no importance but he would have thought that we no longer have any need for him. Thus the wrangle over position continues. But the situation has evolved more thoroughly than before. Outside the country, Sihanouk can work with us. While inside the country he feels completely lost without any future. He is very frustrated. He lacks work, he is bored and the environment that surrounds him, in particular his wife who cries constantly, pushes him to the point that he cannot endure any longer. In the case that he decides to remain with us, that cannot last either, at the most l or 2 years. As he wishes to leave, his leaving now is the best.

2. POSITIVE and Negative aspects of his Resignation

A. Positive Aspects for our Revolution:

· All the people of Kampuchea will feel a huge surge of relief. The same applies to all our cadres and military. As far as the world is concerned, there won't be any problem.

· We can resolve the problem of the nomination in our State Organisation easily. And under these conditions we can work peacefully without any obstacles.

· Our work in External Affairs will thus be improved because henceforth we will make the decisions ourselves, we will express our position by ourselves. Without Sihanouk we are clean-cut.

B. Negative Aspects for our Revolution

· On the one hand, Vietnam attacks us and treats us as being too far to the left. Sihanouk has helped us, so why should we drop him? Vietnam will point out to others, saying something bad about us, but good about themselves. But it is a provisional problem only. If in the final analysis we remain very close to them, we shall certainly have no problem.

· On the other hand, the enemy is about to attack us, but we should let them be for say half a month. But even if Sihanouk had not resigned the enemy will always attacks us, their spies still exist. If the enemy does not cease attacking us, are we going to suffer? No, because they cannot isolate us.

3. MEASURES to be Taken: two directives

A. First directive: We don't reject him. We ask him to remain in the same position. If he wishes to remain with us, he could remain for 5 months, l or 3 years, as long he would like. If he cannot resist, it is not because of us, it is not our fault. In fact he won't be able to remain with us. He and his family can see very well that they won't have well-being We don't give him any choice, if he does not wish to remain, too bad for him.

Thus we must go and see him and ask him to excuse us for being unable to pay him visits as often as we would like, because we were very busy. We SHOULD acknowledge reception of his letter. That is why we come together to see him. The Situation of our country is very difficult, very poor, the country must face tremendous difficulties. We must resolve all the problems with national dignity. It is in this way that we can be truly independent. Our position, including that of the government, is of always recognizing his noble contribution, HIS deeds and efforts for the country, in particular in the international arena.

The [Khmer] Nation owes him its gratitude for his highly patriotic contribution, something which our Assembly has already noted in its resolutions. We respect a lot [our] collective decisions once they have been adopted. But we request that he remains with the people. The people will preserve his nationalist undertakings and we also will congratulate him and will do our utmost to implement the resolution of our extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

B. Second Directive: in the event that he insists on resigning. We thank him. In the recent past we fought together, shoulder to shoulder. We very much regret his resignation. We shall convoke a meeting of the Council of Ministers to take a decision. If he resigns we won't allow him to leave the country. His departure will render the situation complicated to China. The enemy does not cease to condemn and criticize us. If we refuse to allow him to leave, the enemy can criticize us at least for one month. Certain reasonable attitudes of Sihanouk show a patriotic spirit, but his wife has no patriotic spirit at all. Consequently, if we are not clear in solving this problem, it is possible that unresolved questions will complicate our tasks later on. Thus we should go for the first solution and if that does not work, adopt the second one.

III. ANGKAR'S OPINION (meeting of 13 March 1976)

Comrade HEM made several reports to the Standing Committee on the Sihanouk problem. He has made a categorical decision to resign. He asks Angkar that it TAKE PITY ON him. HE lowers and humbles himself only requesting Angkar that it accepts his resignation. This resignation is not against us...

Comrade Secretary General pointed out that it is an important question to be decided by the Central Committee of the Party. But Comrade Secretary General has already prepared a number of ideas, which WERE supported by the Standing Committee:

1. To forbid Sihanouk from leaving the country is the first measure to be taken.

2. It is necessary to call a meeting of the Council of Ministers to submit to it reports on the matter, in order for the latter to make a decision and, then, to meet Sihanouk once again, with the presence of Penn NOUTH

It is necessary that arrangements be made to record the conversation with Sihanouk. It is necessary to speak to him in such a way for him to keep UP his hopes and allow the recording of his conversation. It is for our documentation.

3. To dispatch telegrams to the sons of Sihanouk asking them to return as soon as possible, pointing out that they must come for the New Year and the National Day celebration. We must solve this problem once and for all. We must also solve it for the interests of our revolution.

4. Is Our Decision TRUE TO Revolutionary Morality?

a. As the morality of the Revolution or the interests of the Revolution. The morality of the revolution must be based on the interests of the revolution. It is a gain for the revolution. To allow Sihanouk to leave is a loss for the Revolution. In reality, Sihanouk is a meek tiger, which only has its skin and bones left, without claws and the fangs. HIS beard has also been shaven. Thus all that remains is to wait for the day of his death. But if this old tiger is freed in the street, all the children would certainly be afraid of it. Certain old men that did not know this meek tiger would also be afraid.

b. Sihanouk participated with us in our Revolution despite his differences with us. That is the reason why our Party decided that Sihanouk should become President of Democratic Kampuchea. But Sihanouk refuses. Thus it is up to him, he can remain or not, it is his problem.

We consider him as a Senior Personality. We shall not kill him. But vis-a-vis the people and the Nation, Sihanouk must also be punished for his fault of having massacred the people.

Thus our decision is reasonably taken in every respect. We shall not change it. But if he continues to resist us, we shall take measures to liquidate him.

5. Direction of the Evolution of our Revolution:

Consequently, it is necessary to put an end to feudalism. We have reached this stage. The whole feudal regime has been destroyed and definitively dismantled by the Revolution. The Monarchy existing for over 2000 years has finally been dismantled. We do not have any other alternatives. Reactions will certainly take place, but we must follow the path of the Revolution in order to win.

6. Another Measure to be Taken:

Henceforth, Sihanouk shall not be allowed to meet foreign diplomats. We shall give them valid reasons to explain the situation.