“ASEAN and Thai-Cambodian Conflict from Historical,Current and Regional Perspectives”
"The ICJ had ruled that the Temple was Cambodian territory. However, the area of contestation was the 4.6 sq km area in the immediate vicinity. In 2008, clashes had occurred between Thai and Cambodian troops, and more recently, Thailand had demanded the removal of a Cambodian flag from the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara pagoda which was located in the 4.6 sq km area. Thailand had also drawn up its own map, which showed its claims to territory in and around the border area. On 31 January 2011, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva insisted that “the use of force will be the last option”, and that he could not withdraw the troops in the area, due to Thailand’s “right” over the area. The yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) had called for the Thai government to “revoke a pact with Cambodia on settling border disputes, withdraw from UNESCO and force Cambodian residents off land claimed to belong to Thailand”.
source:http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=2663
How Thailand lost the case at ICJ
The Court sees the matter differently. It is clear from the record that the publication and communication of the eleven maps referred to earlier, including the Annex 1 map, was something of an occasion. This was no mere interchange between the French and Siamese Governments, though, even if it had been, it could have sufficed in law. On the contrary, the maps were given wide publicity in all technically interested quarters by being also communicated to the leading geographical societies in important countries, and to other circles regionally interested; to the Siamese legations accredited to the British, German, Russian and United States Governments; and to all the members of the Mixed Commission, French and Siamese. The full original distribution consisted of about one hundred and sixty sets of eleven maps each. Fifty sets of this distribution were allocated to the Siamese Government. That the Annex 1 map was communicated as purporting to represent the outcome of the work of delimitation is clear from the letter from the Siamese Minister in Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok, dated 20 August 1908, in which he said that "regarding the Mixed Commission of Delimitation of the frontiers and the Siamese Commissioners' request that the French Commissioners prepare maps of various frontiers, the French Commissioners have now finished their work". He added that a series of maps had been brought to him in order that he might forward them to the Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs. He went on to give a list of the eleven maps, including the map of the Dangrek region - fifty sheets of each. He ended by saying that he was keeping two sheets of each map for his Legation and was sending one sheet of each to the Legations in London, Berlin, Russia and the United States of America.
source:http://www.thailawforum.com/database1/international-court-of-justice9.html
"The ICJ had ruled that the Temple was Cambodian territory. However, the area of contestation was the 4.6 sq km area in the immediate vicinity. In 2008, clashes had occurred between Thai and Cambodian troops, and more recently, Thailand had demanded the removal of a Cambodian flag from the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara pagoda which was located in the 4.6 sq km area. Thailand had also drawn up its own map, which showed its claims to territory in and around the border area. On 31 January 2011, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva insisted that “the use of force will be the last option”, and that he could not withdraw the troops in the area, due to Thailand’s “right” over the area. The yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) had called for the Thai government to “revoke a pact with Cambodia on settling border disputes, withdraw from UNESCO and force Cambodian residents off land claimed to belong to Thailand”.
source:http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=2663
How Thailand lost the case at ICJ
The Court sees the matter differently. It is clear from the record that the publication and communication of the eleven maps referred to earlier, including the Annex 1 map, was something of an occasion. This was no mere interchange between the French and Siamese Governments, though, even if it had been, it could have sufficed in law. On the contrary, the maps were given wide publicity in all technically interested quarters by being also communicated to the leading geographical societies in important countries, and to other circles regionally interested; to the Siamese legations accredited to the British, German, Russian and United States Governments; and to all the members of the Mixed Commission, French and Siamese. The full original distribution consisted of about one hundred and sixty sets of eleven maps each. Fifty sets of this distribution were allocated to the Siamese Government. That the Annex 1 map was communicated as purporting to represent the outcome of the work of delimitation is clear from the letter from the Siamese Minister in Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok, dated 20 August 1908, in which he said that "regarding the Mixed Commission of Delimitation of the frontiers and the Siamese Commissioners' request that the French Commissioners prepare maps of various frontiers, the French Commissioners have now finished their work". He added that a series of maps had been brought to him in order that he might forward them to the Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs. He went on to give a list of the eleven maps, including the map of the Dangrek region - fifty sheets of each. He ended by saying that he was keeping two sheets of each map for his Legation and was sending one sheet of each to the Legations in London, Berlin, Russia and the United States of America.
source:http://www.thailawforum.com/database1/international-court-of-justice9.html
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Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram&Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat
(Thai ideology )
In power in 1938, Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram closely collaborated with Luang Wichit Wathakan, a prolific nationalist writer and composer, to reconstruct the Thai history, one that portrayed the country‘s vulnerability and at the same time its greatness in the past. the process of re-glorifying Siam‘s history and revived the issue of lost territories in order to legitimise his military regime. Phibun embarked on the campaign to recover the lost provinces from the French. The Phibun government, printed the Thai map which showed Cambodia as being historically a Thai territory. It also claimed that the Thais and Khmers were one and the same people. France had to warn Phibun against harbouring any designs on Cambodia.Phibun‘s irredentist claims effectively stirred up anti-French sentiment in Bangkok, subsequently leading to a series of skirmishes with French troops on the Thai-Cambodian border. In the meantime, Phibun forged intimate ties with Japan and implemented a pro-Japanese foreign policy. The Franco-Siamese conflict allowed Japan to demonstrate its amicable relationship with the Phibun regime. Japan, in 1941, decided to step in to mediate in the conflict and the final settlement gave the disputed areas in Cambodia and Laos back to Thailand.Not until 1947, two years after Japan lost the war, was Thailand forced to return the Cambodian provinces back to France. King Norodom Sihanouk mentioned in his book Sweet and Sour Memories that Cambodia‘s territory had become whole again.
Thailand and Cambodia further to the brink of engaging in a full-scale war. In 1962, they took the temple dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Thai Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) called on Thais to display their love for the nation in the battle to regain Thailand‘s lost property. His government urged each Thai to donate one baht toward the expense for the court case. The ICJ finally ruled the case in Cambodia‘s favour. Sarit, in his nationalistic response to the ICJ ruling, said, With blood and tears, "we shall recover the Phra Viharn one day".
Sarit immediately lit the fire of nationalism among the Thais by underlining the theme of lost territories. He took advantage of the ICJ ruling by constructing a new history for the Phra Viharn. Sarit saw the loss of the temple, which, he claimed, had been fiercely defended throughout the history by courageous Thai ancestors, as the loss of another piece of Thai territory. He urged the Thais to always remember that the temple was stolen by the enemy who lacked dignity and legitimacy with its abhorrent tactics. Yet, successive Thai governments never challenged the ICJ verdict simply because they were unable to find new evidence to counter the earlier ruling.
(note: this article intended for Khmer to understand Thai ideology, thanks from L.C)
Complicated Relations
(Thai Ideology)
Relations more complicated following the outbreak of the Cambodian-Vietnamese war. The Khmer Rouge regime founded Democratic Kampuchea in 1975, even though its core ideology was rigidly communist. The Khmer Rouge reign characterised the tragic era of Cambodian history in which up to 3 million might have been killed under the leadership of Pol Pot. Only after Vietnam Liberation of Cambodia in 1978 did the genocide stop. Thailand went ahead with establishing its diplomatic relations with China in 1975. It hoped that the détente with China and the support given to the Khmer Rouge would contain the military advancement of communist Vietnam in the region. The Khmer Rouge survived their expulsion from Cambodia due to a steady supply of arms from China, delivered to the Khmer Rouge by the Thai forces who wanted a buffer against the Vietnamese. In the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand exploited its position as a frontline state Face-to-face the communist threat while successfully Aseanising its anti-Vietnam policy.
The redemption
Supalak Ganjanakhundee points out that it is the first time in modern history that a Cambodian leader openly plays internal Thai politics. Normally, it has been the Thai side that influenced Cambodian domestic politics. In the past, Thailand supported the Cambodian opposition to destabilise the regime in Phnom Penh. PM Hun Sen himself had gained first hand experience as Thailand backed the Khmer Rouge and the coalition against him in the 1980s. Many of his political enemies sought refuge in Thailand. Supalak said, PM Hun Sen probably thinks now is the time to pay back.Charnvit added that during the Cambodian conflict, Thailand supported the Khmer Rouge. But now,PM Hun Sen is doing the same thing by supporting the Thai Rouge (the red-shirts).From this perspective, PM Hun Sen is crafting his country‘s foreign policy toward Thailand, using the historical context in which the Thais were heavily involved with the Khmer rouge in order to rationalise his inimical attitude toward the incumbent Abhisit government.
(note: this article intended for Khmer to understand Thai ideology, thanks from L.C)
The new policy of Hun Sen regime today is to kill all Ex Khmer Rouge because they are the true Khmer patriot that can be harmful to Hun Sen regime as Vietnam slave.
Hun Sen regime sends all Ex Khmer rouge soldiers to frontline fighting with Thai army without enough weapons and foods. Hun Sen ordered the front line army do not fire back to Thai Army while they bomb Ex Khmer Rouge over 50 000 shells. These actions are representing very clear that Hun Sen is trying to clear or kill all Ex Khmer Rouge army by using Thai hands.
The true and real Khmer patriots are the enemy of Hun Sen regime. Vietnam is scare of Ex Khmer Rouge Soldiers as they have been defeat Vietnam army (Over 100 000 Vietnam soldiers have been killed by EX Khmer Rouge Army in Cambodia. That is lead to Vietnam withdraw out of Cambodia) before 1993.
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