Thaksin homecoming: Spoiling for a fight

Thaksin returns from exile.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak writes that the time couldn't be better for the triumphant return of Thaksin Shinawatra. But Mr Thaksin will be unable to stop himself from trying to take control - and that sets up a replay of the dramatic 2001 confrontation of Thaksin versus the judicial system.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

He was down but never out. After nearly 18 months in self-imposed exile after the coup in September 2006, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has made a triumphant return.
That Mr Thaksin chose yesterday for his homecoming is unsurprising. It is peak time for him, his supporters and allies. The People Power Party won the election resoundingly two months ago, and has successfully formed a coalition government, which has just completed its policy announcement in parliament. At the same time, the PPP’s post-election credibility and legitimacy have eroded quickly.
The rambunctious official prime minister, Mr Samak Sundaravej, is entangled in a public furore involving his denial of the gruesome violence on 6 October 1976 in which scores of student activists were killed and maimed.
Mr Samak has suggested that Mr Thaksin’s return and the amnesty on the banned 111 PPP-associated politicians who operated under Thai Rak Thai party could wait until the latter months of the government’s term. This is unlikely to be the bidding Mr Samak was supposed to do for Mr Thaksin. Mr Samak, in short, has become more of a liability than an asset. The PPP is also beset with rifts and tensions from within. No one can call the shots and settle intra-PPP differences as effectively as Mr Thaksin.
In addition, the Samak cabinet has included a number of unsavoury figures that are unappealing to the general public. The longer Mr Thaksin waits to return, the more politically problematic the Samak government will be. What Mr Thaksin cannot afford is another Bangkok-based anti-government protest movement in Bangkok. Returning at this time maximises Mr Thaksin’s post-election political gains.
Moreover, his opponents have been severely wounded and weakened. The military junta that ousted him is in disgrace. Gen Sonthi Boonyaratklin and Gen Saprang Kalayanamitr, Mr Thaksin’s erstwhile arch-nemeses are in retreat to a point that they have reneged on their previously tough words and posture. They have suddenly sounded more conciliatory and forthcoming in betrayal of their coup rationales and objectives. Gen Anupong Paochina, has concurrently taken a soft line towards Mr Thaksin’s return.
Overall, the military as an institution is in quiet disgrace – without a violent suppression of pro-democracy forces this time as opposed to May 1992. The generals ousted Mr Thaksin’s government, took power, and derailed democratic rule only to botch the interim period in which the caretaker government of Gen Surayud Chulanont put forth murky policy directions with controversial results in some areas and none in others. The far-reaching ramification of the military’s retreat is that their direct role in the political arena is now marginalised and hemmed in.
On the other hand, the Bangkok-driven anti-Thaksin columns under the People Alliance for Democracy are in disarray, discredited and defanged by the inept post-coup period and by the recent election results that overwhelmingly favoured Mr Thaksin’s proxy PPP.
A number of PAD leaders are seen as having benefitted from the coup by self-aggrandisement and by contesting for power in the polls in opposition of PPP. The PAD’s fundamental mistake is that it never made a genuine effort over the past two years to reach out to the rural grassroots who formed the unflinching basis of Mr Thaksin’s power and resilient popularity. Instead, the PAD chose to remain a limited Bangkok-based and middle class-oriented anti-Thaksin movement with little broad appeal. The noises that it is now making are unlikely to reverberate as far and wide as were seen and heard two years ago.
Indeed, Mr Thaksin’s homecoming represents his vindication and triumph and the manifest failure of his opponents to put him away. At issue now is what he will do next.
Despite Mr Thaksin’s words of resignation and his stated intention of staying away from politics, he is likely to be the PPP-led government’s de facto chief executive.
Mr Thaksin’s impulses are to be the first mover, the agenda setter who dictates terms and shapes outcomes. Initially, he will try to stay on the sidelines, but as all eyes are increasingly fixated on his preferences and as PPP politicians and cabinet members of all stripes flock to him, Mr Thaksin will not be able to help himself in taking charge from behind the scenes. He also needs to take control to ensure that the in-fighting within the PPP and within the coalition government is contained.
Already, Finance Minister Surapong Suebwonglee wants to appoint Mr Thaksin as an economic advisor. This sort of proposal would allow the former leader to be on the sidelines but yet still inside Thai politics.
Above all, Mr Thaksin is back to exert clout and bring pressure to bear on the judicial decisions that are pending. The upcoming legal cases from corruption and abuses of power to poll fraud will determine Mr Thaksin’s political and financial fortunes and the PPP’s survival in view of House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyapairat’s "red card" by the Election Commission as well as Thailand’s entire political future.
Mr Thaksin is an unrivalled master at manoeuvrings. He proved it before in 2001 when he was narrowly acquitted in his assets-concealment trial soon after his Thai Rak Thai party secured a firm democratic mandate at the polls. A replay of Mr Thaksin and his allies versus the judicial system appears in the offing.