Tribalism and sectarianism afflict Western societies too. So why do they seem to be tearing the Middle East apart?
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| Napoleon Bonaparte at the Sphinx during the Egypt campaign in 1798, painted by Jean Leon Gerome, c 1868 [Getty] |
14 Sep 2015
About the Author
Khaled Diab
Khaled
Diab is an award-winning Egyptian-Belgian journalist, writer and
blogger. He is the author of Intimate Enemies: Living with Israelis and
Palestinians in the Holy Land. He blogs at www.chronikler.com
The
disintegration of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya - and the increasing
likelihood of the redrawing of their maps once the dust settles - are
widely regarded by the West and the Arab world as a symptom of tribalism
and sectarianism that the imperial powers were unable to contain
through the "artificial borders" they imposed.
While
it is true that many of the conflicts in the region have taken on a
tribal, sectarian, or even religious dimensions - or a combination of
the three - they did not start out that way. The idea that
centuries-old, Sunni-Shia animosities are behind the violence in, say,
Syria or Yemen , are simply self-serving myths and half-truths.
Yet,
the media and politicians continue to fixate on this conviction,
echoing the late Egyptian diplomat Tahseen Bashir's infamous quip that:
"Egypt is the only nation-state in the Arab world. The rest are just
tribes with flags."
While
a number of countries in the region are small enough to qualify as a
tribe with a flag, this is not unique to the Arab world. And I'm not
just thinking of Africa and other developing societies there.
Despite
the Enlightenment era's focus on individualism and the shining light of
reason, the West, after all these centuries, has not shaken off many
elements of its traditional tribalism, and new forms of tribalism have
also emerged.
As
a small example, take Belgium: the country of which I am a naturalised
citizen. Not belonging to either of its two main linguistic communities,
I have often been baffled by the amount of mutual bitterness and
distrust on view.
The
quiet conflict between Flemings and Walloons that has been simmering
for over a century could easily be framed in "tribal" terms - what is
(ethno-)nationalism, after all, except a broader form of tribalism?
However, to frame it as so would be to oversimplify an extremely complex
situation.
As
for "artificial borders", Europe, like the Middle East, is replete with
them. The two world wars were, at least partly, a case of border
insanity.
There
isn't a country in Europe whose borders are not artificial, whose past
frontiers do not overlap with those of its neighbours and whose
population is not a messy mix of peoples.
Belgium
is a prime example of how fake European frontiers are. Following
Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815 and the dissolution of the first
French empire, what is today Belgium was handed over to the Dutch king,
William I.
Like
Sunnis in modern-day Iraq, the Protestant minority controlled the
state, though all citizens theoretically enjoyed legal equality.
Belgian Revolution
Some
15 years later, as the revolution fomented in neighbouring France, the
Catholic majority of the southern Netherlands revolted in what became
known as the Belgian Revolution.
How
much of it was sectarian and religious, and how much was a reaction to
William I's unlimited (despotic) power and his bulldozer approach to
modernisation (imposing modern notions of equality on his traditionalist
subjects and stripping the Catholic Church of its centuries-old
privileges) is hard to ascertain.
Sectarianism was the apparent driver of the conflict back then. Language is today.
Responding
to the uprising, the great European powers agreed to give Belgium its
independence, drawing lines in the mud, similar to those they would draw
later in the Middle East's sand. Belgium was destined to serve as a
buffer zone (read: regular punching bag) between Germany, France, and
the Netherlands.
And
faultlines like this abound across Europe. In fact, there isn't a
country in Europe whose borders are not artificial, whose past frontiers
do not overlap with those of its neighbours, or whose population is not
a messy mix of peoples.
This
raises the question of how and why it is that European states manage to
keep their tribal undercurrents in check, while the Middle East is
apparently being torn asunder by the very same forces.
Napoleon's retreat from the Battle of Waterloo [Getty]
That's
because it is not. If it were, then Egypt should be - due to its
apparently more homogeneous nature and far clearer regional boundaries,
not to mention the head-start it got as a modern nation-state - the most
stable country in the region.
Brink of failure
Tribalism
is the symptom, rather than the cause, of the Middle East's ills.
Unlike the generally much older nation-state experiments in Europe, many
Arab states have failed and others are on the brink of failure.
This
is due to a complex mix of poor governance, corruption,
authoritarianism, economic and gender inequality, poverty,
under-education, foreign domination, overpopulation, environmental
stress, and more. The vacuum left by this enormous, state-shaped black
hole has enabled the demons of tribalism and sectarianism to rear their
ugly heads.
That
does not mean that the West is immune. It is simply cushioned by
effective governance, relative prosperity, greater freedom, and the
painful memory of the totally destructive power of modern-day tribalism,
both between nations and within them.
But
there is no room for complacency. Disintegration can come fast, like a
chain reaction. Order can quickly descend into disorder, and the most
"civilised" can rapidly descend into the most "barbaric".
Many
of the ingredients of that sort of unravelling are already in place,
but the secret combination that unleashes mayhem has not yet been mixed
in. Early signs of this include the growing "tribalism" within and
between European states, including the Greek-German standoff and the
rising spectre of far-right nationalism from France to Hungary - not to
mention huge levels of youth unemployment, growing hardship, and
inequity.
Across
the Atlantic, the United States has among the greatest inequalities in
the advanced industrialised world, enormous interracial tensions,
massive gun crime, mass incarceration, growing class divisions, and
longstanding tensions between the north and south that could rapidly
erupt given the right catalyst.
While
Western societies today appear robust enough to deal with these
challenges, the chance still exists that, with time, the "never again"
of yesteryear will become the "not again" of tomorrow. Let's hope that
does not happen.
Khaled
Diab is an award-winning Egyptian-Belgian journalist, writer and
blogger. He is the author of Intimate Enemies: Living with Israelis and
Palestinians in the Holy Land. He blogs at www.chronikler.com.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source: Al Jazeera


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