Bhumibol Adulyadej, the king who never smiles.Unknown author
Sent to Khmerization by an anonymous reader.
Read The Khmer-Thai Royal Family Tree here.
King Bhumibol Adulyadej was born in 1927 in Boston to Prince Mahidol, the half brother of the then Thai king [King Prajadipok or Rama VII]. Brought up on French, English, Latin, and German vocabulary in Switzerland, he showed greater ability than Ananda, his older brother, who acceded to the throne in 1935. With hobbies like photography, fast cars, and jazz music, he was initially more like a European bon vivant than the sibling of a Buddhist dhammaraja (virtuous king) of the Chakri dynasty.
On June 9, 1946, at 9:20AM King Bhumibol's brother, King Ananda Mahidol, was found shot to death in his bed, with his own handgun nearby. Officially the death is simply ruled "mysterious.". Ananda Mahidol was shot with Colt.45 in the forehead while lying flat on his back in bed. Although some have implicated Bhumibol in his brother's death, the matter remains clouded in part because insulting the dignity of the king can lead to criminal prosecution in Thailand, Bhumibol uses Thailand's lese majeste law to imprison anyone who dares to talk about his brother's murder.
In 1951, the Thai military undertook a coup and stripped Bhumibol of the powers that he was slowly regaining. THE KING WAS THREATENED WITH REMOVAL OR EXPOSURE AS ANANDA'S KILLER if he did not cooperate with the junta and maintain an air of normality for the next four years. Shrinking from an overt fight, the palace reverted to reinforcing the traditional religious bases of royal support. "By not being seen to seek political power, the throne would prove itself an able rival to the generals" (p. 119). Through canny self-promotion, the king stole a notch over corrupt army men as a true Buddhist visionary. Simultaneously, the palace exploited rivalries within the junta and authored a special relationship with the C.I.A.-affiliated Border Patrol Force.
Starting with Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the 1957 coup inaugurated a tradition of king-worshipping autocrats. A confident Bhumibol declared that Western democracy was alien and unnecessary and warned of the coming "red menace." Triumphal state visits to non-communist countries in the 1960's sealed his external political recognition and were televised back home in public relations blitzes. The palace awarded decorations calculatedly to deepen its constituency among the wealthy and influential classes. Royalists reinforced the king's divinity and exaggerated brilliance by commandeering government ministries of education and religion. With the monarchy back at the center of Thai national culture, Sarit's successor generals had no choice but to defer to the king for their own legitimacy.
The king personally negotiated the terms for allocating Thai soldiers to the American war in Vietnam in 1967 Stressing dhamma-based selflessness and unity, he derided pro-democracy and antiwar agitators. In 1971, the palace blessed yet another coup amid rising turbulence. During the mass protests for a new constitution in 1973, Bhumibol persuaded the generals to offer sops to get the students off the streets. Eventually, when the demonstrators forced the junta to flee the country, the king paradoxically claimed the moral high ground for restoring democracy.
In 1976, Bhumibol gave a quiet nod to the removal of the prime minister by conservative forces opposed to the "leftward drift." The close palace-military relationship exacerbated rampant indiscipline and excesses of the army brass. Street enforcing fascist movements arose directly under the monarch to terrorize the left and anyone who dared question the regime. Bhumibol overruled the interim prime minister's démarche to the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Thailand, a humiliation that led to his loss in the elections. Rightist monks with palace links went to the extent of claiming that killing students and communists was a "Buddhist duty" (p. 232).
On Oct. 6, 1976, with the king's storm troopers in front, a horrifying massacre of more than 100 persons was committed as palace favorite generals again seized the reins. Handley assesses that frustration at the failure of the crown's investments and pet development schemes was the key to the king's descent into "reactionary panic" (p. 247).
With Bhumibol's imprimatur, a surge of arrests, searches, and assassinations were carried out for alleged "royal desecration." The Democracy Monument in Bangkok was intended to be razed to the ground "because it was not associated with anything royal" (p. 261). A protest "could be permitted if it was an act of allegiance to the king" (p. 266).
In 1977, when moderate generals staged a coup without Bhumibol's consent, the king snubbed the new order. With characteristic persistence, he stepped up ritual appearances, resumed rural development activities, and rebuilt the palace's circle of allies. In 1980, Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda was installed in power via a "royal coup" to run a "government of the king." The Bhumibol-Prem partnership fostered unprecedented adulation for the throne, turning even strictly religious holidays into royal grandstanding. Government departments marshaled large public displays of fealty and the entire resources of the state were placed at Bhumibol's disposal for economic projects whose credit accrued to the king alone. The effect was that more and more Thais "looked beyond the government to their king to escape from misery" (p. 291).
Numerous personal scandals of the royal family were covered up in the 1980's as the king's dedication to Buddhism was over-advertised. However, the growth of an urban middle class meant that the public was skeptical of the throne's partisanship in the legislature. Poor farmers, scientists, intellectuals, and N.G.O.'s attacked royalists for their long history of environmental destruction and mistreatment of displaced persons. Unsigned leaflets circulated on Bhumibol's 60th birthday decrying royal self-perpetuation and misbehavior. It coincided with revelations of the sale of royal honors for commercial benefit.
The elected civilian government of 1989 bowed to changes in Thai society and played down old royal culture. Royal favorites were shunted out of office and the king's commercial interest monopolies were broken. Army commanders tried to harness the palace's discontent and Bhumibol was receptive by openly expressing disappointment with the government. Following the script of earlier takeovers, once the king indicated that a coup was acceptable, palace-favored generals took over again in 1991 to save Thailand from "parliamentary dictatorship." Bhumibol went on to call democracy a "highbrow ideal that could weaken society" (p. 343).
He did not question methodical suppression of pro-democracy protesters and laid the ideological foundation for a massacre in May 1992 that killed several dozens of marchers. Unrepentant generals remained in power knowing that Bhumibol had a "consistent bias against popular movements" (p. 359). The king rejected knowledgeable Thai and foreign opinions that the country badly needed democratic institutionalization.
In the early 1990's, Bhumibol admonished Chuan Leekpai's government as incompetent and utilized the military to thwart the civilian government. Against the official policy line, the king encouraged the Thai army to assist the military junta in Burma and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. N.G.O.'s were subjects of special royal ire for opposing his ill-conceived hydroelectric dams. To woo urban Thais, Bhumibol invested substantial sums into countering Bangkok's traffic snarls. By going public with pseudo-economic ideas christened as the "New Theory," he sought to establish his image as a genius in science and magic.
reference
Sreeram Chaulia October 4, 2006
King Bhumibol Adulyadej was born in 1927 in Boston to Prince Mahidol, the half brother of the then Thai king [King Prajadipok or Rama VII]. Brought up on French, English, Latin, and German vocabulary in Switzerland, he showed greater ability than Ananda, his older brother, who acceded to the throne in 1935. With hobbies like photography, fast cars, and jazz music, he was initially more like a European bon vivant than the sibling of a Buddhist dhammaraja (virtuous king) of the Chakri dynasty.
On June 9, 1946, at 9:20AM King Bhumibol's brother, King Ananda Mahidol, was found shot to death in his bed, with his own handgun nearby. Officially the death is simply ruled "mysterious.". Ananda Mahidol was shot with Colt.45 in the forehead while lying flat on his back in bed. Although some have implicated Bhumibol in his brother's death, the matter remains clouded in part because insulting the dignity of the king can lead to criminal prosecution in Thailand, Bhumibol uses Thailand's lese majeste law to imprison anyone who dares to talk about his brother's murder.
In 1951, the Thai military undertook a coup and stripped Bhumibol of the powers that he was slowly regaining. THE KING WAS THREATENED WITH REMOVAL OR EXPOSURE AS ANANDA'S KILLER if he did not cooperate with the junta and maintain an air of normality for the next four years. Shrinking from an overt fight, the palace reverted to reinforcing the traditional religious bases of royal support. "By not being seen to seek political power, the throne would prove itself an able rival to the generals" (p. 119). Through canny self-promotion, the king stole a notch over corrupt army men as a true Buddhist visionary. Simultaneously, the palace exploited rivalries within the junta and authored a special relationship with the C.I.A.-affiliated Border Patrol Force.
Starting with Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the 1957 coup inaugurated a tradition of king-worshipping autocrats. A confident Bhumibol declared that Western democracy was alien and unnecessary and warned of the coming "red menace." Triumphal state visits to non-communist countries in the 1960's sealed his external political recognition and were televised back home in public relations blitzes. The palace awarded decorations calculatedly to deepen its constituency among the wealthy and influential classes. Royalists reinforced the king's divinity and exaggerated brilliance by commandeering government ministries of education and religion. With the monarchy back at the center of Thai national culture, Sarit's successor generals had no choice but to defer to the king for their own legitimacy.
The king personally negotiated the terms for allocating Thai soldiers to the American war in Vietnam in 1967 Stressing dhamma-based selflessness and unity, he derided pro-democracy and antiwar agitators. In 1971, the palace blessed yet another coup amid rising turbulence. During the mass protests for a new constitution in 1973, Bhumibol persuaded the generals to offer sops to get the students off the streets. Eventually, when the demonstrators forced the junta to flee the country, the king paradoxically claimed the moral high ground for restoring democracy.
In 1976, Bhumibol gave a quiet nod to the removal of the prime minister by conservative forces opposed to the "leftward drift." The close palace-military relationship exacerbated rampant indiscipline and excesses of the army brass. Street enforcing fascist movements arose directly under the monarch to terrorize the left and anyone who dared question the regime. Bhumibol overruled the interim prime minister's démarche to the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Thailand, a humiliation that led to his loss in the elections. Rightist monks with palace links went to the extent of claiming that killing students and communists was a "Buddhist duty" (p. 232).
On Oct. 6, 1976, with the king's storm troopers in front, a horrifying massacre of more than 100 persons was committed as palace favorite generals again seized the reins. Handley assesses that frustration at the failure of the crown's investments and pet development schemes was the key to the king's descent into "reactionary panic" (p. 247).
With Bhumibol's imprimatur, a surge of arrests, searches, and assassinations were carried out for alleged "royal desecration." The Democracy Monument in Bangkok was intended to be razed to the ground "because it was not associated with anything royal" (p. 261). A protest "could be permitted if it was an act of allegiance to the king" (p. 266).
In 1977, when moderate generals staged a coup without Bhumibol's consent, the king snubbed the new order. With characteristic persistence, he stepped up ritual appearances, resumed rural development activities, and rebuilt the palace's circle of allies. In 1980, Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda was installed in power via a "royal coup" to run a "government of the king." The Bhumibol-Prem partnership fostered unprecedented adulation for the throne, turning even strictly religious holidays into royal grandstanding. Government departments marshaled large public displays of fealty and the entire resources of the state were placed at Bhumibol's disposal for economic projects whose credit accrued to the king alone. The effect was that more and more Thais "looked beyond the government to their king to escape from misery" (p. 291).
Numerous personal scandals of the royal family were covered up in the 1980's as the king's dedication to Buddhism was over-advertised. However, the growth of an urban middle class meant that the public was skeptical of the throne's partisanship in the legislature. Poor farmers, scientists, intellectuals, and N.G.O.'s attacked royalists for their long history of environmental destruction and mistreatment of displaced persons. Unsigned leaflets circulated on Bhumibol's 60th birthday decrying royal self-perpetuation and misbehavior. It coincided with revelations of the sale of royal honors for commercial benefit.
The elected civilian government of 1989 bowed to changes in Thai society and played down old royal culture. Royal favorites were shunted out of office and the king's commercial interest monopolies were broken. Army commanders tried to harness the palace's discontent and Bhumibol was receptive by openly expressing disappointment with the government. Following the script of earlier takeovers, once the king indicated that a coup was acceptable, palace-favored generals took over again in 1991 to save Thailand from "parliamentary dictatorship." Bhumibol went on to call democracy a "highbrow ideal that could weaken society" (p. 343).
He did not question methodical suppression of pro-democracy protesters and laid the ideological foundation for a massacre in May 1992 that killed several dozens of marchers. Unrepentant generals remained in power knowing that Bhumibol had a "consistent bias against popular movements" (p. 359). The king rejected knowledgeable Thai and foreign opinions that the country badly needed democratic institutionalization.
In the early 1990's, Bhumibol admonished Chuan Leekpai's government as incompetent and utilized the military to thwart the civilian government. Against the official policy line, the king encouraged the Thai army to assist the military junta in Burma and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. N.G.O.'s were subjects of special royal ire for opposing his ill-conceived hydroelectric dams. To woo urban Thais, Bhumibol invested substantial sums into countering Bangkok's traffic snarls. By going public with pseudo-economic ideas christened as the "New Theory," he sought to establish his image as a genius in science and magic.
reference
Sreeram Chaulia October 4, 2006
7 comments:
Preah Vihear has witnessed its fair share of bloodshed
Preah Vihear has witnessed its fair share of bloodshed because Preah Vihear have the shameless neighbour that not abiding by a decision that the highest court in the world made more than 48 years ago. In June 1979, Thai soldiers brutally forced 45,000 refugees from Pol Pot's "Killing Fields" to descend the heavily mined escarpment back into Cambodia. "Several thousand died, either executed by Thai soldiers to prevent them trying to cross back, or blown up in the minefields," British historian Philip Short wrote in a seminal biography of Pol Pot.
A shameless fraudulent statement was made by Thai Democrat MP Sirichok Sopha "The ICJ ruled only the temple was under Cambodia's sovereignty and Thailand obligated to hand the ruin temple to Cambodia, not soil under and surrounding the ruin": The Nation, 25 June 2008. This has been the Thai shameless theme since July 1962. The shameless Thai Foreign Affairs Statement of 25 March 2008 reinforces this shameless theme.
A Thai Columnist Nophakhun Limsamarnphunnop writes the misleading article "the issue of the surrounding areas, currently in Thailand's territory, would be complicated and the integrity of Preah Vihear complex would be compromised, given that a number of elements of the temple such as a giant reservoir and the Naga staircase are situated in Thai territory.": The Nation 28 June 2008.
This could escalate into war. It is a hot issue in Thai politics and the dispute has arisen from Thai shameless misleading of the International Court of Justice Judgment of June 1962 on the part of Thai successive governments, politicians, Thai academics for theirs shameless political purposes.
The clarification of ICJ verdict request by Cambodia will trigger the rogue state of Thailand animosity against Cambodia for years to come.
(thanks L.C)
Preah Vihear has witnessed its fair share of bloodshed
Preah Vihear has witnessed its fair share of bloodshed because Preah Vihear have the shameless neighbour that not abiding by a decision that the highest court in the world made more than 48 years ago. In June 1979, Thai soldiers brutally forced 45,000 refugees from Pol Pot's "Killing Fields" to descend the heavily mined escarpment back into Cambodia. "Several thousand died, either executed by Thai soldiers to prevent them trying to cross back, or blown up in the minefields," British historian Philip Short wrote in a seminal biography of Pol Pot.
A shameless fraudulent statement was made by Thai Democrat MP Sirichok Sopha "The ICJ ruled only the temple was under Cambodia's sovereignty and Thailand obligated to hand the ruin temple to Cambodia, not soil under and surrounding the ruin": The Nation, 25 June 2008. This has been the Thai shameless theme since July 1962. The shameless Thai Foreign Affairs Statement of 25 March 2008 reinforces this shameless theme.
2
A Thai Columnist Nophakhun Limsamarnphunnop writes the misleading article "the issue of the surrounding areas, currently in Thailand's territory, would be complicated and the integrity of Preah Vihear complex would be compromised, given that a number of elements of the temple such as a giant reservoir and the Naga staircase are situated in Thai territory.": The Nation 28 June 2008.
This could escalate into war. It is a hot issue in Thai politics and the dispute has arisen from Thai shameless misleading of the International Court of Justice Judgment of June 1962 on the part of Thai successive governments, politicians, Thai academics for theirs shameless political purposes.
The clarification of ICJ verdict request by cambodia will trigger the rogue state of Thailand animosity against cambodia for years to come.
(thanks L.C)
2
A Thai Columnist Nophakhun Limsamarnphunnop writes the misleading article "the issue of the surrounding areas, currently in Thailand's territory, would be complicated and the integrity of Preah Vihear complex would be compromised, given that a number of elements of the temple such as a giant reservoir and the Naga staircase are situated in Thai territory.": The Nation 28 June 2008.
It is a hot issue in Thai politics and the dispute has arisen from Thai shameless misleading of the International Court of Justice Judgment of June 1962 on the part of Thai successive governments, politicians, Thai academics for theirs shameless political purposes.
The clarification of ICJ verdict request by cambodia will trigger the rogue state of Thailand animosity against cambodia for years to come.
(thanks L.C)
a crooked thai's king....
THAILAND: Threats to academic reflect continuous decline in enjoyment of fundamental rights, emboldened military
At a press conference in Thailand on 24 April 2011, Somsak Jeamteerasakul and several coalitions of academics, human rights activists, and journalists released statements calling for the protection of freedom of speech in Thailand. These statements were in response to a series of blatant threats made towards Somsak over comments that some people have considered amounted to criticism of the royalty. Somsak's statement at this event is available on the independent news website, Prachatai: http://prachatai.com/english/node/2441.
Among the threats, the most alarming is that from the current commander of the army, General Chan-ocha, who directly criticized and derided Somsak in an interview on April 7, describing him as "a mentally ill academic" who "is intent on overthrowing the institution" of the monarchy. In the current highly polarized political situation in Thailand, where ultra-conservative forces are using the symbolic power of the king and royal institutions to advance a new authoritarian project, these statements from the head of the army are not only inappropriate but also are extraordinarily dangerous.
While the police have not yet charged Somsak with any offence, according to various sources, some kind of investigation is underway against him. At the same time, he has been threatened extralegally. Unknown men have come on motorcycles to nearby his house, and he has been receiving harassing telephone calls, which in Thailand constitute early warning signals of impending violence if the target does not stop whatever he or she is doing.
This Thai king is the force behind the Thailand invasion of Cambodia to take Preah Vihear. He might appears very innocent old man but don't be fooled by him. This king has the absolute power over his country. If he approved the action to take Preah Vihear, his servants such as Abhist and General Prayuth would do just that. The politicians would do the talking while the military generals do the fighting, all for the sake of getting what that king wants. His last dying wish is to see Preah Vihear in Thailand's grip and to see Cambodia the last conquer territory for Thailand. Yea..good luck on that, Your Royal Lowness
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