From left: Burma’s Prime Minister Thein Sein, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, Laos’ Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh and Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan link arms during the 5th Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam (CLMV) summit, at the Council of Ministers in Phnom Penh yesterday.
Published: 17/11/2010
Published: 17/11/2010
Bangkok Post
In one short week over two long decades, Burma has returned to a window of potential political transition not seen since its last elections in 1990 were hijacked by the military.
This time, the orchestrated polls on Nov 7 have overwhelmingly sent military-backed representatives of the Union Solidarity and Development Party to parliament.
On election day, renewed fighting between the Burmese army and ethnic minority groups flared up along the Thai-Burmese border.
Less than a week later, the iconic leader of Burma's opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, was freed from house arrest where she had been confined for 15 of the last 21 years.
The implications from these momentous times in Burma are immense for Thailand, Southeast Asia and beyond.
The contrast between the responses to the election results from the West and Burma's near-abroad was conspicuous. China and India's comments were muted. Both Asian giants have vested interests in Burma's economic development, having courted and competed for the ruling generals in Naypyidaw for strategic assets and natural resources.
As Southeast Asia's main regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations's receptive reaction was a foregone conclusion. The elections were the culmination of Asean's longstanding policy of "constructive engagement" and its now-proven rationale for accepting the generals' Burma back in 1997. Notwithstanding dissenting voices from Indonesia and the Philippines, Asean will now want to tick the electoral box on Burma's democratic checklist and move on.
As the country most directly affected by events in Burma, Thailand also revealed its hand well before the elections. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's initial reaction to the polls was to stick to the stated time-frame of the military-sponsored constitution of a three-month period before power is transferred to the elected government.
Although his predecessor and mentor, former prime minister Chuan Leekpai, made a point of not setting foot on Burma's soil in the late 1990s when the State Peace and Development Council was ensconced in power, Mr Abhisit not only visited Naypyidaw but came home with a multi-billion-dollar port development deal.
The Democrat Party-led government leader did not even visit Burma then, but his successor a decade later has now reversed course. Thailand's relative emphasis on human rights and democracy as its foreign policy underpinnings have gone out the window. But if pragmatism and material interests are to dictate Thailand's Burma policy, they should be rethought.
Thailand needs to come up with a longer-term energy outlook and a forward-looking immigration policy.
The port deal at Dawei (Tavoy) should be seen as part of a broader package of Thailand's growing energy dependence on Burma. More than 70% of Thai electricity generation derives from natural gas, and nearly half of that portion is imported from Burma's gas pipelines, with the rest made up of coal, hydro and petroleum sources. Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar are negligible. Nuclear power would be a viable alternative, as Vietnam's imminent construction of two nuclear power plants attests.
But for Thailand, nuclear power will need broad-based public discussions and hearings to promote trust and confidence and allay civil society concerns. Nuclear power is thus many years in the distance _ if it ever materialises.
Thailand, in short, is beset by energy insecurity. On a per-capita basis, Thailand's electricity consumption is in the range of the developed economies in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). And its foreseeable energy future is reliant on natural gas. Until it can tap into reserves in unexplored areas in the Gulf of Thailand, particularly the overlapping claims with Cambodia, Thailand's gas dependence on Burma will grow.
In turn, such dependence will constrain Thai foreign policy vis-a-vis Burma.
The fluid and precarious post-election interplay in Burma should prompt Thai leaders to start thinking about longer-term energy security.
Another serious challenge will be the demographics of economic growth. More than two million migrant workers from Burma are reportedly resident in Thailand, without corresponding rights to education and health care. Many of these migrant workers, now in their second generation, are unlikely to return to Burma even if peace and stability are restored.
A long-term comprehensive immigration policy, as opposed to the current ad hoc registration, could provide them with residency rights with access to proper education and health care. They now form the backbone of the back-breaking work in service industries, particularly construction, processed food and fisheries. If they continue to be excluded from the system and preyed on by Thai authorities for extortionist gains, they may become a source of social problems and crime in the years to come, owing to a lack of access to education and career mobility. The Thai economy can no longer thrive without these essential workers.
The more immediate demographic challenge will take place along the Thai-Burmese border.
Mr Abhisit's crass and myopic three-month reference for Burma's power transfer does not conduce to the logistical and humanitarian preparations that should be put in place.
The armed conflicts between the Burmese army and the ethnic minorities may well go on indefinitely. Largely unrepresented in parliament both at the national and regional levels following the polls, the major ethnic groups, such as the Karen and the Shan, are unwilling to lay down arms and be absorbed into the border guard forces controlled by the Burmese armies.
The growing spectre of civil war should lead Thai policy-makers and military commanders to start thinking about longer-term refugee sanctuaries along the border. It is not sustainable to receive the displaced ethnic refugees one day and repatriate them the next.
International relief agencies should be allowed and encouraged to share the burden. A longer-term refugee policy and accommodation, which has been a trademark in Thailand's foreign dealings in the past, should be formulated immediately.
The drugs production and trafficking associated with minority groups' war-financing will also need to be checked and deterred.
Burma after elections stands at a precipice. It could turn out well over a long transition, or very badly in relatively short order. The risks of continued military rule fronted by a bogus electoral regime on the one hand clashing with a pent-up and long-suffering opposition bent on going for "too much, too soon" will grow.
Thailand needs to be better prepared by providing safe havens along the border, relying less on Burma's natural gas and accommodating Burmese and Burmese minority workers who are contributing to the Thai economy for the long haul.
This time, the orchestrated polls on Nov 7 have overwhelmingly sent military-backed representatives of the Union Solidarity and Development Party to parliament.
On election day, renewed fighting between the Burmese army and ethnic minority groups flared up along the Thai-Burmese border.
Less than a week later, the iconic leader of Burma's opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, was freed from house arrest where she had been confined for 15 of the last 21 years.
The implications from these momentous times in Burma are immense for Thailand, Southeast Asia and beyond.
The contrast between the responses to the election results from the West and Burma's near-abroad was conspicuous. China and India's comments were muted. Both Asian giants have vested interests in Burma's economic development, having courted and competed for the ruling generals in Naypyidaw for strategic assets and natural resources.
As Southeast Asia's main regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations's receptive reaction was a foregone conclusion. The elections were the culmination of Asean's longstanding policy of "constructive engagement" and its now-proven rationale for accepting the generals' Burma back in 1997. Notwithstanding dissenting voices from Indonesia and the Philippines, Asean will now want to tick the electoral box on Burma's democratic checklist and move on.
As the country most directly affected by events in Burma, Thailand also revealed its hand well before the elections. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's initial reaction to the polls was to stick to the stated time-frame of the military-sponsored constitution of a three-month period before power is transferred to the elected government.
Although his predecessor and mentor, former prime minister Chuan Leekpai, made a point of not setting foot on Burma's soil in the late 1990s when the State Peace and Development Council was ensconced in power, Mr Abhisit not only visited Naypyidaw but came home with a multi-billion-dollar port development deal.
The Democrat Party-led government leader did not even visit Burma then, but his successor a decade later has now reversed course. Thailand's relative emphasis on human rights and democracy as its foreign policy underpinnings have gone out the window. But if pragmatism and material interests are to dictate Thailand's Burma policy, they should be rethought.
Thailand needs to come up with a longer-term energy outlook and a forward-looking immigration policy.
The port deal at Dawei (Tavoy) should be seen as part of a broader package of Thailand's growing energy dependence on Burma. More than 70% of Thai electricity generation derives from natural gas, and nearly half of that portion is imported from Burma's gas pipelines, with the rest made up of coal, hydro and petroleum sources. Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar are negligible. Nuclear power would be a viable alternative, as Vietnam's imminent construction of two nuclear power plants attests.
But for Thailand, nuclear power will need broad-based public discussions and hearings to promote trust and confidence and allay civil society concerns. Nuclear power is thus many years in the distance _ if it ever materialises.
Thailand, in short, is beset by energy insecurity. On a per-capita basis, Thailand's electricity consumption is in the range of the developed economies in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). And its foreseeable energy future is reliant on natural gas. Until it can tap into reserves in unexplored areas in the Gulf of Thailand, particularly the overlapping claims with Cambodia, Thailand's gas dependence on Burma will grow.
In turn, such dependence will constrain Thai foreign policy vis-a-vis Burma.
The fluid and precarious post-election interplay in Burma should prompt Thai leaders to start thinking about longer-term energy security.
Another serious challenge will be the demographics of economic growth. More than two million migrant workers from Burma are reportedly resident in Thailand, without corresponding rights to education and health care. Many of these migrant workers, now in their second generation, are unlikely to return to Burma even if peace and stability are restored.
A long-term comprehensive immigration policy, as opposed to the current ad hoc registration, could provide them with residency rights with access to proper education and health care. They now form the backbone of the back-breaking work in service industries, particularly construction, processed food and fisheries. If they continue to be excluded from the system and preyed on by Thai authorities for extortionist gains, they may become a source of social problems and crime in the years to come, owing to a lack of access to education and career mobility. The Thai economy can no longer thrive without these essential workers.
The more immediate demographic challenge will take place along the Thai-Burmese border.
Mr Abhisit's crass and myopic three-month reference for Burma's power transfer does not conduce to the logistical and humanitarian preparations that should be put in place.
The armed conflicts between the Burmese army and the ethnic minorities may well go on indefinitely. Largely unrepresented in parliament both at the national and regional levels following the polls, the major ethnic groups, such as the Karen and the Shan, are unwilling to lay down arms and be absorbed into the border guard forces controlled by the Burmese armies.
The growing spectre of civil war should lead Thai policy-makers and military commanders to start thinking about longer-term refugee sanctuaries along the border. It is not sustainable to receive the displaced ethnic refugees one day and repatriate them the next.
International relief agencies should be allowed and encouraged to share the burden. A longer-term refugee policy and accommodation, which has been a trademark in Thailand's foreign dealings in the past, should be formulated immediately.
The drugs production and trafficking associated with minority groups' war-financing will also need to be checked and deterred.
Burma after elections stands at a precipice. It could turn out well over a long transition, or very badly in relatively short order. The risks of continued military rule fronted by a bogus electoral regime on the one hand clashing with a pent-up and long-suffering opposition bent on going for "too much, too soon" will grow.
Thailand needs to be better prepared by providing safe havens along the border, relying less on Burma's natural gas and accommodating Burmese and Burmese minority workers who are contributing to the Thai economy for the long haul.
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